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ERISA: RE-THINKING FIRESTONE IN
LIGHT OF GREAT-WEST-IMPLICATIONS
FOR STANDARD OF REVIEW AND THE
RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN WELFARE
BENEFIT CLAIMS
DONALD T. BOGAN*

I.

PREFACE

With the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA)1 in 1974, Congress created an express
federal remedy for workers to recover benefits due under
employment-provided fringe benefit programs. 2
Now, almost
thirty years later, courts remain confused about the character of
that remedy. 3 Is an ERISA plan participant's action to recover
* Director of Clinical Education and Associate Professor of Law, University of
Oklahoma College of Law. A.B. Brown University, 1974; J.D. Wake Forest
University School of Law, 1979.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (Supp. III 1997) and in scattered sections of the Internal
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.). A selected history of ERISA, beginning in January
1973 with the introduction of House Bill 2, H.R. 2, 93d Cong. (1973), and
Senate Bill 4, S. 4, 93d Cong. (1973), the bills which ultimately formed the
basis of the final legislation, are compiled in a three volume committee print.
See 1-3 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUB.
WELFARE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereafter LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY]. ERISA regulates employee benefit plans. Employee benefit plans
are fringe benefit programs provided or available to workers and their
beneficiaries through the worker's employment, either from the worker's
employer, or union, or from both. ERISA §§ 3(1)-(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1)-(2)
(2000). ERISA employee benefit plans include both pension benefit plans and
welfare benefit plans. ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3). Welfare benefit
plans are any non-pension fringe benefit programs, whether self-funded by the
provider or funded through the purchase of insurance, including health care
benefit plans, accident and death benefit plans, disability benefit plans and
severance benefit plans. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
The most
significant exceptions to ERISA's regulation of employee benefit plans are for
government provided plans and for church plans. ERISA § 4(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1003(b) (2000).
2. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
3. See, e.g., Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 141-42
(3d Cir. 1987), affd in part and rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (reviewing
the use of both the arbitrary and capricious standard, and the de novo
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promised fringe benefits in the nature of a claim for breach of
4
contract, or did Congress intend trust law to govern the remedy?
The answer to that question is important-it may dictate what
standard of review a court will apply in a worker's claim for
benefits. Correspondingly, the level of review a court applies,
whether de novo or deferential, often determines the outcome of a
benefits dispute. 5 Further, the characterization of the remedy
provided in ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) 6 to recover benefits due under a
plan as either a contract claim for legal relief or a trust law claim
for equitable relief determines whether the right to a jury trial
7
attaches.
In a breach of contract lawsuit, a trial judge does not defer to
any litigants' declaration of facts or interpretation of contract
8
terms. Rather, a court reviews the parties' contentions de novo.
Under a contract law de novo review standard, a court typically

standard). Compare Novak v. Andersen Corp., 962 F.2d 757, 759 (8th Cir.
1992) (stating that a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim for benefits seeks legal relief) with
Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 636 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that a
§ 502(a)(1)(B) claim for benefits seeks equitable relief). The United States
Supreme Court has issued divided opinions in many of its ERISA remedies
decisions interpreting various subparts of ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132
(2000). See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204
(2002) (5/4 decision); Varity Corp v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996) (6/3 decision);
Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248 (1993) (5/4 decision); Mass. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (5 joined majority opinion and 4 joined
concurring opinion).
4. Compare John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The
Supreme Court's Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003) [hereinafter Trail of Error] (stating that trust law
governs ERISA) with Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer's
Shield: The Perversity of ERISA FiduciaryLaw, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391
(2000) (noting that trust law governs ERISA remedies, but trust law is
influenced by contract law principles), and with George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA:
Reformulating the Federal Common Law for Plan Interpretation, 32 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 955 (1995) (explaining that contract law and trust law
principles apply to ERISA in different circumstances); Jay Conison, Suits for
Benefits under ERISA, 54 U. PiTT. L. REV. 1 (1992) (arguing that contract law,
trust law, and labor law each should inform the development of federal ERISA
common law).
5. Bruch, 828 F.2d at 147. See, e.g., De Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d
1180, 1188 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We have given the standard of review issue such
considerable attention for the simple reason that, were we to consider de novo
review appropriate, we might well hold for the retirees. Indeed the appellants
have offered an interpretation of the Plan which could well be considered not
only 'reasonable,' but 'more reasonable' than Vitro's.").
6. 29 U.S.C § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000). See infra note 208, for a complete
recital of the remedies provided in ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132, the
statute's civil enforcement provision.
7. See discussion infra notes 249-288 and accompanying text.
8. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989)
(stating that "[a]s they do with contractual provisions, courts construe terms
in trust agreements without deferring to either party's interpretation.").
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hears evidence and, with the help of a jury if one of the parties so
chooses, decides the facts and determines anew what the contract
means. Under trust law, similar to contract disputes, courts
review the parties' evidence and contentions de novo, unless the
trustee is exercising a discretionary power. 9 Trust law, however,
differs substantially from contract law in the standard of review
that courts apply when the settlor of a trust confers discretionary
powers upon a trustee. Trust law instructs courts to defer to the
decisions of a non-conflicted trustee acting within the scope of his
or her discretionary authority, even if the court believes the
trustee acted wrongly, so long as the trustee did not abuse his or
her discretion. 10 Under this trust law "abuse of discretion" review
standard," a court will not interfere with the trustee's exercise of
a discretionary power "unless the trustee ... acts dishonestly, or
with an improper even though not a dishonest motive, or fails to
use his judgment, or acts beyond the bounds of reasonable
judgment."12

9. See id. at 112, 115; discussion infra notes 16-17.
§ 187 (1959). See also Brown v.
Ret. Comm. of Briggs & Stratton Ret. Plan, 797 F.2d 521, 529 (7th Cir. 1986)
("When [discretionary power] has been conferred, the judicial role is limited to
determining whether the... [Committee's] interpretation was made rationally
and in good faith-not whether it was right." (quoting Riley v. MEBA Pension
Trust, 570 F.2d 406, 410 (2d Cir. 1977)); Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362,
1371 (9th Cir. 1977) (explaining that courts defer to the discretionary actions
of a trustee so long as its conduct is not "arbitrary, capricious, or made in bad
faith, not supported by substantial evidence, or [is] erroneous on a question of
law.").
-11. In Firestone, the Supreme Court uses the terminology "arbitrary and
capricious" as developed in labor law cases, rather than the "abuse of
discretion" terminology incorporated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS (1959), for defining a deferential standard of review. Firestone, 489
U.S. at 113-14. I will use the terms interchangeably in this article because
most courts use the terms interchangeably.
See Cox v. Mid-America
Dairymen, Inc., 965 F.2d 569, 572 n.3 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
distinction between the two terms is a "distinction without a difference");
Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1558, n.1 (11th
Cir. 1990) (equating the two standards). But see Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. Assoc. Health & Welfare Plan, 201 F.3d 335, 341-42 (4th Cir. 2000)
(affirming that the abuse of discretion standard, and not the arbitrary and
capricious standard, is to be used for review of discretionary decisions);
Morton v. Smith, 91 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1996) (elaborating on the
difference between the two standards). See also Meditrust Fin. Serv. Corp. v.
Sterling Chems., Inc., 168 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing cases); Lowry v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Ret. Plan, 871 F.2d 522, 525 (5th Cir. 1989) (reserving
question whether abuse of discretion standard is equivalent to or less strict
than arbitrary and capricious standard).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. e (1959). See, e.g.,
Morton, 91 F.3d at 870 ("A decision constitutes an abuse of discretion when it
is 'not just clearly incorrect but downright unreasonable."' (quoting Fuller v.
CBT Corp., 905 F.2d 1055, 1058 (7th Cir. 1990))).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
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In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 13 the United States
Supreme Court ruled that a trial court evaluating an ERISA plan
participant's claim for benefits arising from an employee fringe
benefit program should examine the plan administrator's adverse
benefits decision under a de novo review standard. 14 In dicta,
however, the Firestone Court suggested that if an ERISA plan
granted the plan administrator discretion to interpret the terms of
the plan or to make final benefits determinations, a court should
review the plan administrator's claim denial under the deferential
abuse of discretion standard. 15 The only exception identified by
the Firestone Court where the deferential review standard should
be modified was the circumstance of a conflict of interest infecting
the plan administrator's decision-making.16
13. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
14. Id. at 115. In ERISA cases, the question often arises whether de novo
review means that the trial court reviews the record before the plan
administrator de novo or whether the trial court is free to consider evidence
outside of the plan administrator's file. Firestonedid not address this question
and the circuits appear to be split. Compare Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g., 900
F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that "[n]othing in the legislative history
suggests that Congress intended that federal district courts would function as
substitute plan administrators, a role they would inevitably assume if they
received and considered evidence not presented to administrators concerning
an employee's entitlement to benefits. Such a procedure would frustrate the
goal of prompt resolution of claims by the fiduciary under the ERISA
scheme.") with Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Conn., 936 F.2d 98, 104
(2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a court may consider evidence outside the
administrator's record on de novo questions of plan interpretation); Moon v.
Am. Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (11th Cir. 1989) ("[The insurer's]
contention that a court conducting a de novo review must examine only such
facts as were available to the plan administrator at the time of the benefits
denial is contrary to the concept of a de novo review."); Sheehan v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 01 Civ. 9182, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11789, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. June
28, 2002) (noting conflict among circuits regarding court's review of evidence
outside of the plan administrator's claims file). The question of whether
ERISA actually involves an "administrative review" process is addressed
elsewhere within this issue. See Mark D. DeBofsky, The Paradox of the
Misuse of Administrative Law in ERISA Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 727 (2004). See also Donald T. Bogan, The Unsupported Delegation of
Conflict Adjudication in ERISA Benefit Claims under the Guise of Judicial
Deference, 57 OKLA. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2004). See also discussion
infra note 42.
15. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (stating that a denial of benefits is to be
reviewed de novo, unless the administrator has discretionary authority). See
also John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV.
207 [hereinafter Supreme Court Flunks Trusts] (presenting criticism of
Firestone rationale because trust law does not require trust instruments to
grant discretion in order for trustee to have discretionary powers).
16. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 ("Of course, if a benefit plan gives
discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of
interest, that conflict must be weighed as a 'facto[r] in determining whether
there is an abuse of discretion."' (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 187, cmt. d (1959))).
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The Firestone Court's discussion of a deferential standard of
review resulted from the Court's understanding that trust law
principles generally govern ERISA.17 Unfortunately, the Firestone
Court failed to fully contemplate the rationale for anchoring its
decision in trust law when the employee benefit plan under
18
consideration in Firestone was not funded through a trust.
Additionally, the FirestoneCourt failed to examine the nature of a
plan participant's remedy for "benefits due ...under the terms of
his plan" provided in ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) to determine whether
that remedy corresponded with the Court's application of trust
law. 19
ERISA requires employers to fund employee pension plans
through the establishment of a trust, or through the purchase of
insurance. 20 However, the statute exempts welfare benefit plans,
such as the severance pay plan at issue in Firestone, from ERISA's
funding requirements. 21 Firestone, in fact, did not separately fund
17. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (holding that "consistent with established
principles of trust law, we hold that a denial of benefits challenged under
[ERISA 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.] § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de
novo standard, unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the
terms of the plan.").
18. See id. ("Because we do not rest our decision on the concern for
impartiality that guided the Court of Appeals, we need not distinguish
between types of plans or focus on the motivations of plan administrators and
fiduciaries. Thus, for purposes of actions under [ERISA 502(a)(1)(B), 29
U.S.C.] § 1132(a)(1)(B), the de novo standard of review applies regardless of
whether the plan at issue is funded or unfunded and regardless of whether the
administrator or fiduciary is operating under a possible or actual conflict of
interest.") (internal citations omitted).
19. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000) authorizes a plan
participant to sue in state or federal court "to recover benefits due to him
under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan,
or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." See
infra note 208 for a complete recital of the remedies provided in ERISA § 502,
29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).
20. ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2000). See infra notes 185-193
and accompanying text.
21. ERISA § 301(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(1) (2000). ERISA plans can be
funded through the establishment of a trust, or through the purchase of
insurance, or plans can be unfunded. Id. When this article refers to a plan as
"unfunded," it means that the plan sponsor, usually the employer, pays
benefits due under the plan out of its general treasury or operating capital,
rather than through a segregated trust or through insurance proceeds.
Additionally, a plan can employ a hybrid funding mechanism, where the plan
is self-insured (and typically unfunded) up to a certain dollar amount (known
as the attachment point) and insured for losses above the attachment point
through the purchase of commercial stop-loss insurance. See Dedeaux v. Pilot
Life Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 1311, 1313 n.2 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
Employers often utilize the hybrid funding mechanism to support their health
care benefits plan. See, e.g., Behavioral Scis. Inst. v. Great-West Life, 930
P.2d 933 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). See generallyA. Foster Higgins & Co., Foster
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its severance pay plan through a trust or through the purchase of
insurance; rather, the plan was unfunded. 22 The nature of a plan's
funding mechanism seems a vital element in evaluating whether
trust law or contract law principles should govern plan claims
administration. It is worth repeating, therefore, that in Firestone,
the employer paid any approved severance benefits out of its
operating capital. The employer did not segregate assets for the
purpose of funding the plan and it did not appoint a trustee to
oversee the administration of any segregated trust res.
As it happened in Firestone, the Court's application of trust
law to govern plan claims practices under the employer's unfunded
severance pay plan did not significantly impact the outcome of the
Court's standard of review decision. Since the Firestone plan
contained no grant of discretionary power to the plan
administrator, the contract law de novo review standard and the
trust law standard of review were essentially the same. 23 The
former Firestone employees, therefore, were fortunate to prevail in
the Supreme Court under the Court's application of trust law. In
cases subsequent to Firestone, however, plan participants have
suffered the fallout from Firestone's indiscreet dicta, and from the
decision's incongruous underpinnings suggesting that trust law
should control claims for benefits due under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)
arising from a plan which is not funded through a trust. 24
Following Firestone, many employers and other plan
sponsors 25 predictably added broad grants of discretion to the plan
Higgins Health Care Benefits Survey 19 (1992) (reporting that 67% of
employers self-funded their medical benefit plans in 1992, and that 73% of
those self-funded plans purchased stop-loss insurance to protect against
significant payouts) (cited in Jeffrey G. Lenhart, Comment, ERISA
Preemption: The Effect of Stop-Loss Insurance on Self-Insured Health Plans,
14 VA. TAX REV. 615 n.1 (1995)). Additionally, plan sponsors under collective
bargaining agreements often arrange hybrid funding mechanisms where selffunded plans establish Taft-Hartley trusts to fund the initial payment of
benefits, and then purchase commercial stop-loss coverage to insure claims
over the stated attachment point.
See, e.g., Moore v. Provident Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 786 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1986); Mich. United Food &
Commercial Workers Unions & Food Employers Health & Welfare Fund v.
Baerwaldt, 767 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1985).
22. Firestone,489 U.S. at 105.
23. Id. at 115. However, on remand, the Supreme Court's reliance on trust
law would have affected the worker's right to a jury trial. See infra notes 247286 and accompanying text.
24. The Firestone Court assumed, without really deciding, that trust law
governed the standard of review question presented. The opinion remarks
that "ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust law."
Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110. However, the Court also noted that because it
based its decision on the plan's failure to grant the plan administrator
discretionary powers, de novo review applied "regardless of whether the plan
at issue is funded or unfunded." Id. at 115.
25. The "plan sponsor" is either the employer, or the employee's union,
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administrator in their ERISA-governed employee benefit plans. 26
Given such grants of discretion, lower courts have routinely
applied an abuse of discretion review standard to ERISA claim
denials, regardless of the plan funding mechanism, 27 debating only
how a fiduciary's conflict of interest should modify the deferential
standard. 28 Since Firestone,academic commentary concerning the
which established the benefit plan, or the committee or joint board of trustees
appointed by a multiple employer group or an employer and union group.
ERISA § 3(16)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(B) (2000). For ease of reference,
hereinafter I assume that an employer is the plan sponsor in establishing an
employee benefit plan.
26. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 383 n.2 (3d
Cir. 2000) (remarking that Professor John H. Langbein, in his article entitled
The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, supra note 15, at 217, accurately predicted
that employers would quickly add grants of discretion to their plans and that
"problems of how courts should deal with conflicted fiduciaries would
resurface"). See also Muir, supra note 4, at 412 & n.146 (noting that it is not
surprising that employers reserve discretion in order to get a deferential
standard).
27. See, e.g., Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 711 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Here
we are dealing with the interpretation by an employer-administrator of the
terms of the employer's unfunded welfare benefit plan. We see no reason why
ERISA calls for a different [anything other than arbitrary and capricious]
standard of review here."); Holland v. Burlington Indus., 772 F.2d 1140, 1148
(4th Cir. 1985).
Though many cases applying this [arbitrary and capricious] standard to
eligibility disputes do involve trusts, there is no reason to apply a
different standard here [to an unfunded plan]. Where claim eligibility is
involved, it is necessary to ensure that primary responsibility rests with
administrators 'whose experience is daily and continual, not with judges
whose exposure is episodic and occasional.'. . . This objective holds true
whenever consistent administration of a pension plan or welfare benefit
plan covered by ERISA is at issue. Claim eligibility disputes, absent a
finding that they have been resolved in an arbitrary and capricious
manner, must remain with those who formulate and administer
company plans and policies, whether formally trustees or not. To vary
the standard of judicial review for general asset welfare plans would
only sow confusion in ERISA, which we decline to do. (internal citations
omitted)
Id.
28. See, e.g., Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d
1048, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing cases prior to Firestone). In Van
Boxel, Judge Posner noted that:
flexibility in the scope of judicial review need not require a proliferation
of different standards of review; the arbitrary and capricious standard
may be a range, not a point. There may be in effect a sliding scale of
judicial review of trustees' decisions-more penetrating the greater is
the suspicion of partiality, less penetrating the smaller that suspicion is.
Id. (internal citations omitted). See also Pinto, 214 F.3d at 384 (collecting
cases); Crespo v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 980, 989 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(identifying factors to consider in evaluation of what was reasonable behavior
under the arbitrary and capricious standard). But see Jebian v. HewlettPackard Co. Empl. Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan, 349 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir.
2003) (noting that even where plan grants discretion to plan administrator, de
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standard of review applicable in ERISA claims has focused on the
conflict of interest question, 29 or on critique of the Supreme Court's
pronouncements on trust law. 30 Largely absent from the postnovo review applies when administrator fails to make decisions within
proscribed time limit).
29. See, e.g., Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA
Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1083, 1102 (2001); Kevin Walker
Beatty, Comment, A Decade of Confusion: The Standard of Review for ERISA
Benefit Denial Claims as Established by Firestone, 51 ALA. L. REV. 733, 735
(2000); Nola A. Kohler, Note, An Overview of the Inconsistency Among the
Circuits Concerning the Conflict of Interest Analysis Applied in an ERISA
Action with an Emphasis on the Eighth Circuit's Adoption of the Sliding Scale
Analysis in Woo v. Deluxe Corporation, 75 N.D. L. REV. 815, 815-16 (1999);
George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA The Arbitrary and CapriciousRule Under Siege,
39 CATH. U. L. REV. 133 (1989) [hereinafter The Arbitraryand Capricious Rule
For pre-Firestone commentary see Bradley R. Duncan,
Under Siege].
Comment, Litigation Under ERISA: Judicial Review of Fiduciary Claim
Denials Under ERISA: An Alternative to the Arbitrary and Capricious Test, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 986, 997-98 (1986); John A. McCreary, Jr. Comment, The
Arbitrary & Capricious Standard under ERISA: Its Origins and Applications,
23 DUQ. L. REV. 1033 (1985).
30. See, e.g., Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, supra note 15, at 223
(criticizing the Supreme Court's application of trust law in Firestone, and
suggesting that the Court could have applied contract law to achieve a better
result). Professor Langbein has remarked upon the underlying contractual
nature of trusts in John H. Langbein, The ContractarianBasis of the Law of
Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625 (1995) [hereinafter Langbein, Basis of the Law of
Trusts], but his most penetrating criticism of the Supreme Court's ERISA
remedies decisions is not the Court's selection of trust law as the paradigm to
evaluate ERISA remedies. Rather, it is his view that the Supreme Court has
applied trust law badly. Langbein, Trail of Error, supra note 4, at 1323. I
agree with much of Professor Langbein's ERISA scholarship, however, in the
debate about whether trust law, or contract law, or some combination of
common law principles should govern ERISA benefits claims, I believe that
Professor Langbein fails to sufficiently credit the fact that ERISA regulates
pension plans and welfare plans differently. In particular, ERISA § 302, 29
U.S.C. § 1082 requires plan sponsors to comply with minimum funding
standards when they establish pension benefit plans, and ERISA § 403, 29
U.S.C. § 1103 requires that all plan assets, except insurance policies, be held
in trust. However, ERISA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 1081 exempts welfare plans from
the statute's requirement that plan sponsors fund plans. Consequently, if an
employer chooses not to fund its welfare benefit plan by not setting aside
specific assets to pay contemplated benefits, there are no plan assets for the
welfare plan to hold in trust. See infra notes 184-193 and accompanying text.
Throughout Professor Langbein's several ERISA articles, he often broadly
states that ERISA requires plan sponsors to fund plans through the
establishment of a trust, without noting that because Congress expressly
exempted welfare plans from ERISA's funding requirements, non-pension
ERISA plans are often unfunded. See, e.g., Langbein, Trail of Error, supra
note 4, at 1324 (stating that "[f]irst, the statute imposes a rule of mandatory
trusteeship, requiring that 'all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held
strict fiduciary
in trust by one or more trustees,' who are subject to ...
duties..."); Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, supra note 15, at
209 (noting "ERISA requires that pension and employee benefit plans take the
trust form."); Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental
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Firestone standard of review discussion, however, is academic
comment which explores the underlying assumptions justifying
the application of trust law, instead of contract law, when an
ERISA welfare plan is unfunded or is funded through the purchase
of insurance, rather than funded through the establishment of a
trust. 3 1

0

Recent Supreme Court ERISA cases suggest that it is time to
reconsider the application of a trust law-based standard of review
in claims for benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) arising from
unfunded or insured ERISA plans. 32 In 2003, the Supreme Court
Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1107
(1988) (stating that "[s]ection 403 imposes a rule of mandatory trusteeship.
Apart from plan assets that take the form of insurance, 'all assets of an
employee benefit plan shall be held in trust .. "'). The fact that a plan
sponsor may choose not to fund a welfare benefit plan through the
establishment of a trust argues against Professor Langbein's view that trust
law principles should always govern the analysis of employee benefit claims,
including the standard of review question. The impact of ERISA's express
exemption from ERISA's trust-funding requirements granted by Congress to
welfare plans has also received inappropriately short shrift from the courts,
which typically assume that trust law dictates the standard of review courts
should apply to plan participant claims for benefits under ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B), even in claims arising from unfunded or insured employee
benefit plans. See, e.g., Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377
(3d Cir. 2000) (dealing with insured plan); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708,
711 (9th Cir. 1985) (unfunded plan).
See infra notes 194-207 and
accompanying test.
31. A notable exception is a thoroughly researched article by Professor Jay
Conison which challenges the foundational basis for applying a trust lawbased standard of review to ERISA claims for benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B).
Conison, supra note 4, at 62. Professor Conison rejects trust law, labor law,
and state contract law as the framework to evaluate ERISA, and suggests
instead that courts borrow from each of those fields to further develop a
federal common law of ERISA to decide ERISA controversies. Id. See also
Muir, supra note 4 at 437-38 (stating that trust law governs ERISA remedies,
but trust law is influenced by contract law principles); Flint, supra note 4, at
959 (discussing judicial interpretation of ERISA under federal common law);
Fischel & Langbein, supra note 30.
32. Since the Travelers opinion acknowledged that the Court's early ERISA
decisions had not been helpful in defining the boundaries of ERISA's
preemption of state law, the Supreme Court has shown a continued
willingness to step back from the overbroad pronouncements found in the
Court's early ERISA opinions. See, e.g., N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (stating "we
have to recognize that our prior attempt to construe the phrase 'relate to' does
not give us much help drawing the line here."); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards
Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr.,Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 336 (1997) (Scalia, J.
concurring) (stating "I think it would greatly assist our function of clarifying
the law if we simply acknowledged that our first take on [ERISA] was
wrong..."). See also Ky. Ass'n of Heath Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471,
1479 (2003) (abandoning the three-factor McCarran-Ferguson Act test to
determine whether a law "regulates insurance" within the meaning of ERISA's
savings clause exception to preemption).
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revisited the ERISA standard of review issue for the first time
since it decided Firestone in 1989. In Black & Decker Disability
Plan v. Nord,3 3 the Supreme Court answered a narrow standard of
review question. 34 However, because the Court could resolve Nord
narrowly, it did not address the larger problem, left unsettled
following Firestonea5 of what effect aplan administrator's conflict
of interest should have on the standard of review, assuming the
trust law standard applies, when a plan administrator exercises
36
its discretionary powers in denying a claim for benefits.

33. 123 S. Ct. 1965 (2003).

34. In Nord, the Court addressed the question of whether the treating
physician rule, as applied in Social Security Administration disability cases,
should be imported to ERISA claims. Id. at 1969-70. The treating physician
rule requires an Administrative Law Judge hearing Social Security disability
cases to credit the opinion of a claimant's treating physician over the opinion
of an independent medical evaluator, unless the agency provides a reason why
the treating physician's medical opinion is less credible. See Andrews v.
Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a procedural rule
requires agency to explain why it rejected treating physician's opinion). The
Social Security Administration has adopted the treating physician rule as an
evidentiary standard requiring the agency to give "more weight" to the
medical opinion of a treating physician than to other medical evidence. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d) (2003). The Nord Court held that only
Congress or the Department of Labor, through its rule-making authority,
could mandate that private ERISA plans adhere to the treating physician rule.
See Nord, 123 S. Ct. at 1972. The Court noted:
Plan administrators, of course, may not arbitrarily refuse to credit a
claimant's reliable evidence, including the opinions of a treating
physician.
But, we hold, courts have no warrant to require
administrators automatically to accord special weight to the opinions of
a claimant's physician; nor may courts impose on plan administrators a
discrete burden of explanation when they credit reliable evidence that
conflicts with a treating physician's evaluation.
Id.
35. In addition to the damage resulting from the Firestone Court's
incongruous application of trust law to claims seeking legal relief from a plan
that was not funded through a trust, the Court's failure to instruct the circuits
on how a conflict of interest effects judicial review of an ERISA plan
fiduciary's discretionary decisions has also helped fuel even greater confusion
in the lower courts. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377,
378 (3d Cir. 2000) noting that:
This appeal concerns the standard courts should use when reviewing a
denial of a request for benefits under an ERISA plan by an insurance
company which, pursuant to a contract with an employing company,
both determines eligibility for benefits, and pays those benefits out of its
own funds. This question, and variations thereof, has bedeviled the
federal courts since considered dicta in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch gave opaque direction about how courts should review
discretionary benefits denials by potentially conflicted ERISA
fiduciaries.
Id.
36. See Nord, 123 S. Ct. at 1969 n.2. (stating "[t]he Plan sought review only
of the Court of Appeal's holding 'that an ERISA disability plan administrator's
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Additionally, in Nord the Supreme Court again failed to question
why courts should apply a trust law standard of review to a plan
administrator's benefits claim denial when the subject plan is not
funded through a trust, 37 and where the underlying remedy sought
by the plan participant sounds in contract, not trust law.
Intertwined with the standard of review issue when a plan
participant sues under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits
due is the question of a plan participant's right to a jury trial. The
constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to claims seeking
equitable relief, such as a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
However, the Seventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution preserves the right to a jury trial in federal court
38
actions at law, such as a claim for contract damages.
The Supreme Court has not addressed the question of an
ERISA plan participant's right to a jury trial. However, in the
recent ERISA remedies decision, Great-West Life & Annuity
Insurance Co. v. Knudson,39 the Court suggested that a claim for
benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) seeks legal, rather than
equitable, relief. 40 With that simple and seemingly incontestable
observation, the Court undermined the equity-based trust law
foundation for applying a deferential standard of review to plan
participant actions challenging benefit claim denials under ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B).
Further, the Knudson Court's recognition that
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) provides a claim for legal relief establishes a
41
plan participant's right to a jury trial in ERISA benefit actions.
Because courts currently apply a trust law standard of review
in ERISA benefit claims litigation, this article comments briefly
upon trust law and the trust law duty of loyalty. However, this

determination is subject to the 'treating physician rule...' We express no
opinion on any other issues.").
37. Black & Decker self-insured the unfunded disability benefits plan at
issue in Nord. Brief for Respondent at 1, Black & Decker Disability Plan v.
Nord, 123 S. Ct. 1965 (2003) (No. 02-469) available in LEXIS at 2002 U.S.
Briefs 469.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. (stating "In suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of common law.").
Id. See infra notes 247-86 and accompanying text.
39. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
40. Id. at 220. In the very same section as § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132
(a)(3), Congress authorized "a participant or beneficiary" to bring a civil action
"to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan," without reference to
whether the relief sought is legal or equitable. But Congress did not extend
the same authorization to fiduciaries. Rather, § 502(a)(3), [29 U.S.C. § 1132
(a)(3)], by its terms, only allows for equitable relief. Id. See infra notes 212-46
and accompanying text.
41. See Bona v. Barasch, 01 Civ. 2289, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4186, at *29
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2003). See infra notes 247-86 and accompanying text.
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article does not focus on the lingering trust law conflict of interest
issue.
Rather, this article inspects the more fundamental,
underlying question: Did Congress intend courts to engraft a trust
law-based standard of review to plan participant claims for legal
relief under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) arising from ERISA welfare
42
benefit plans which are not funded through a trust?
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Bruch v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. 43 reported that the first courts to apply a trust lawbased deferential standard of review in ERISA cases imported that
standard from worker claims arising under the Labor
Management Relations Act (hereinafter LMRA or Taft-Hartley
Act), 44 which had previously borrowed the standard from the
common law of trusts.45 Consequently, I begin Part II, below, with
an examination of the trust law standard of review and the
application of that standard in LMRA cases.
Part III then
explores the Firestone litigation to determine why the Supreme
Court rejected the LMRA analogy,46 yet still applied trust law
42. Further complicating the standard of review question in ERISA benefit
claims is the unfortunate confusion displayed by lower courts in their
application of judicial deference.
There are different levels and kinds of
judicial deference. See Frank H. Easterbrook, JudicialDiscretion in Statutory
Interpretation,57 OKLA. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2004). In ERISA, courts
recite that they defer to plan administrator's decisions because trust law
instructs courts not to control trustee discretionary actions unless the trustee
abused its discretion. In reality, those courts apply administrative law-based
deference rather than trust law-based deference.
In trust cases, trust
beneficiaries investigate their claims by employing standard discovery tools
afforded under the rules of civil procedure and they present their claims at
trial by offering evidence and by cross-examining witnesses against them. In
administrative law-based deference, for example Social Security disability
claims, the claimant employs discovery as authorized in administrative law
and receives a hearing before a neutral Administrative Law Judge (AJ)
where evidence is presented. Consequently, in administrative law-based
judicial deference, when a claimant appeals an adverse benefits decision by an
ALU to federal district court, the district court sits more as an appellate court
than a trial court in reviewing the AIJ decision-there is no right to further
discovery or to a de novo trial. In ERISA claims, even though claimants do not
receive an administrative trial, federal district courts typically do not allow
claimants to conduct discovery or to call witnesses at trial, even when
applying de novo review supposedly under trust law. See supra note 14 and
accompanying text. The confusion in ERISA cases with administrative lawbased judicial deference is addressed elsewhere in this edition of the John
Marshall Law Review. See DeBofsky, supra note 14. See also Bogan, supra
note 14.
43. 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987), rev'd in part and affd in part 489 U.S. 101
(1989) [Hereafter in text I will refer to the Third Circuit opinion as "Bruch"
and to the Supreme Court opinion as "Firestone."].
44. Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (2000)).
45. Bruch, 828 F.2d at 140-44.
46. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109. The Third Circuit preceded the Supreme
Court in rejecting the LMRA trust law analogy to ERISA benefit claims,
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principles to claims arising from an ERISA plan that was not
funded through a trust.
Surprisingly, few post-Firestone federal courts, weighing a
claim for benefits under an insured or unfunded plan, have
remarked on the incongruity of applying trust law to resolve
employee benefit claims arising from ERISA plans which are not
funded through a trust. In Part IV, I examine that incongruity
and, unsurprisingly, conclude that the trust law model fails when
applied to unfunded ERISA plans and to plans funded through the
purchase of insurance. Finally, in Part V, the article summarizes
the law which I suggest requires federal courts to grant ERISA
plan participants the right to trial by jury based upon the legal
nature of the remedy for benefits due under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).
Because it is inapposite to apply trust law to plans that are not
funded through a trust, and because plan participant claims
seeking legal relief under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) sound in contract,
courts should grant ERISA plan participants a de novo trial by
jury in § 502(a)(1)(B) benefit claims arising from insured or
47
unfunded welfare plans.
II. THE TRUST LAW-BASED DEFERENTIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND CLAIMS ARISING UNDER LMRA

A.

§ 302

The Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review in Trust Law

Trust law originated in the world of donative transfers as a
vehicle to pass wealth within the family, focusing particularly on
transfers of real property. 48 In modern times, the use of trusts to

though the two courts emphasized different basis for rejecting the analogy.
Compare id. at 109-10 (rejecting LMRA trust law-based "structural defect"
claim analogy to ERISA) with Bruch, 828 F.2d at 143-45 (rejecting LMRA
analogy to ERISA because LMRA provides for neutral trustees).
47. To the extent that the nature of the remedy dictates whether trust law
or contract law should apply, this article suggests that ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B),
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000), provides a legal claim for relief for breach of
contract, regardless or whether a plan is unfunded, or funded through the
purchase of insurance, or funded through a trust. This article, however, does
not seek to establish whether Congress intended to limit plan participants to
only equitable remedies against plans funded through a trust under other
subsections of ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).
48. See John H. Langbein, Essay, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as
an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 178 (1997) [hereinafter
Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust]; Langbein, Basis of the Law of Trusts,
supra note 30, at 643-44. In ERISA, the trust is just a security device to
guarantee payment of promised benefits. The process to obtain payment is
completely different under ERISA, according to our courts, than it would be
under trust law. Under trust law, to obtain a remedy from trusts assets, a
beneficiary must sue the trustee directly. Under ERISA, courts have held that
only the ERISA plan, or the plan administrator, are proper defendants in a
suit under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits.
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convey property has expanded well beyond testamentary gifts.
Drafters of commercial documents now employ the trust in an
array of business contexts where assets may be segregated and
49
administered for an assortment of specified purposes.
Statutorily created trusts also abound to serve public policy
goals.50 In the area of labor law and employee benefits, the TaftHartley Act directs that private pension and uninsured nonpension employee benefit plans created under collectively
51
bargained contracts must be funded through a trust.
Additionally, ERISA requires non-union, employment-provided,
private pensions to be funded through a trust or through the
5 2
purchase of insurance.
Despite the expanded use of trusts to accomplish a variety of
asset transfers, modern trust law continues to reflect its equitable
origins. Consequently, courts hear claims against a trustee for
53
breach of fiduciary duty without a jury in most states.
Additionally, courts continue to review a trustee's discretionary
decisions in non-commercial trusts under a deferential standard,
absent a trustee's conflict of interest.5 4 Since trust law and the use
of a trust as a funding mechanism stand at the heart of ERISA
standard of review controversies, we should examine some trust
law fundamentals before we consider whether trust law should
serve as the paradigm to evaluate plan participant claims for
benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).
1.

The Elements of a Trust
The elements of a trust include: 1) a trustee who holds trust

See infra note 73 and accompanying text. Given those rulings, there exists a
serious gap in ERISA's remedies provision. How does a plan participant
collect a judgment against an unfunded or under-funded welfare plan unless
the employer is also a defendant, or against an insured plan unless the insurer
is a defendant, or against a plan funded through a trust unless the trust and
trustee are defendants?
49. See Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust, supra note 48, at 173;
Langbein, Basis of the Law of Trusts, supra note 30, at 660-61.
50. See Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust, supra note 48, at 167-79.
51. LMRA § 302 (c), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (2000). This section of the LMRA
also allows the trustee to use trust funds to purchase insurance to pay plan
obligations under a collective bargaining agreement.
52. ERISA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (2000). Importantly, ERISA exempts
welfare benefit plans from the statute's funding requirements. ERISA § 301
(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a). See generally infra notes 184-193 and accompanying
text.
53. George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Jury Trial Mandated for Benefit Claims
Actions, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 361, 394-98 n.183 (1992).
54. Hundreds of reported cases apply a nominally trust law-based
deferential standard of review in suits against ERISA plan administrators.
See, e.g., Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2000).
For a non-ERISA case see Stevens v. Nat'l City Bank, 544 N.E.2d 612, 616
(Ohio 1989). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959).
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property and who owes equitable duties to deal with the trust
property for the benefit of another; 2) a beneficiary; and 3) a "res"
consisting of some segregated trust property held by the trustee
for the beneficiary. 55 Additionally, to create a trust, the settlor
must manifest an intention to establish a trust relationship, with
the accompanying enforceable duties.56
One of the defining characteristics of a trust that
distinguishes beneficiary expectations arising under a trust from
57
those arising under a contract is the segregated trust res.
Historically, the trust served as a funding mechanism for a
Under gift law, the gift beneficiary
gratuitous transfer. 58
generally obtains no right to enforce the gift until there has been a
transfer of the gift property, and then the beneficiary acquires
rights only to what has been transferred. 59 Reflecting the donative
origins of trust law, trust distributions to beneficiaries are
typically limited by the finite assets set aside by the settlor for the
benefit of the trust beneficiaries. 60 Trust beneficiaries, therefore,
generally look only to the trust res to fulfill the settlor's grant in a
donative trust, or perhaps to the trustee if its breach of fiduciary
duty caused some depletion in the trust res. 61 In the donative
trust, however, trust beneficiaries have no trust law claim against
the settlor for breach of their expectations under a trust created
62
for their benefit.
Under contract law, mutual promises generally define the
legal expectations of the contracting parties, not the amount of
money or assets designated by the responsible contractor to fulfill
the contract. 63 Certainly, in practice, the ability of a contracting
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. h (1959).
56. See id. § 23 cmt. a (noting that no special language is required and the

settlor's intentions do not need to be communicated to the beneficiary).
Additionally, a trust can be created by statute without a manifestation of
intention on the part of any settlor. Id. § 23 cmt. c.
57. See Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1214 (8th Cir.
1981) (noting that "[f]unding implies the existence of a res separate from the
ordinary assets of the corporation."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968, 1084 (1981).
58. See Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust, supra note 48, at 165
(arguing that the trust is "essentially a gift, projected on the plane of time and
so subjected to a management regime." (quoting Bernard Rudden, John P.
Dawson's Gifts and Promises, 44 MOD. L. REV. 610, 610 (1981) (book review)).
59.

See WALTER B. RAUSHENBUSH, BROWN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 7.2,

7.3, 7.21 (3d. ed. 1975) (describing the requirement of delivery for a valid gift
and the nature of this requirement). See generally G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 203, 13-17 (rev. 2d ed. 1980) [hereafter,
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS].
60. See generally BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, supra note 59, § 203.
61. Id. § 203, at 861-71.
62. Id. § 203. See generally, Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust, supra
note 48 (comparing charitable trusts to commercial trusts).
63. Additionally, the government regulates even private contracts via the
common law of contracts, and via legislative or administrative rules governing

The John Marshall Law Review

[37:629

party to enforce the contract may be limited by the wealth of the
other contracting party (or by the value of any security that may
be posted to guarantee performance of the contract), but each
party's legal expectations and rights remain fixed by the contract,
64
not by the depth of the opposing party's pocket.
In ERISA, where the trust is sometimes, but not always, used
as a funding mechanism to secure contractually obligated
payments, the prophylactic application of trust law to plan
participant claims under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) is not wholly
consistent with ERISA's remedial scheme or with plan participant
expectations. 65 Plan participants' expectations under their ERISA
employee benefit plans arise from the employer's promise to
provide benefits in exchange for the worker's labor. The benefits
are owed pursuant to a contract, not as a gift. In ERISA, a trust is
sometimes used as an instrument to help guarantee enforcement
of the contract by the plan sponsor, but the trust is not the source
of the employer's obligation. Whether an ERISA plan is funded
through the establishment of a trust or is unfunded, the
employer's responsibility to provide the promised plan benefits
exists independently and regardless of how the employer chooses
to finance the obligation.
The suggestion that trust law exclusively governs ERISA's
remedies provision is problematic also because that view suggests
plan participants may have no basis to collect benefits wrongfully
withheld under their unfunded welfare benefit plans. Consider
contracts in regulated industries.
For example, insurance contracts
incorporate the state's insurance code into every insurance policy issued in the
state. See THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE

§

19:1, at 19-2 to 19-4

(3d ed. 1995) (noting that "[e]xisting and valid statutory provisions enter into
and form part of all contracts of insurance to which they are applicable").
64. See BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, supra note 59, § 121, at 359
(describing the factors that influence the selection of trustees). The reason
courts defer to trustee discretionary decisions arises, at least in part, due to
the finite nature of the trust res and the presumed confidence placed in the
trustee as selected by the settlor. Id. The trust res is limited by assets chosen
by the settlor to fund the trust. Where the settlor identifies several trust
beneficiaries, a trustee's discretionary decision to make a distribution to one
beneficiary necessarily means that there are fewer assets left in the trust for
the other beneficiaries. In such circumstances, where the trustee must choose
how to distribute limited assets among a group of beneficiaries, trust law
instructs courts not to interfere with the trustee's discretionary acts in order
to credit the selection of a trustee who was designated by the settlor to make
such choices. Id.

§

560; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959).

65. In ERISA, the trust is not used as an instrument to accomplish a
donative transfer, rather the trust in ERISA is employed as a security devise
to help insure that separate contract promises from the employer to the
employees are fulfilled. See Bruch, 828 F.2d at 145 (providing such factual
scenario). The court noted that "[t]he trust [sic] at issue here provides
severance benefits, which are a form of wages. The benefits were offered as an
inducement to the plaintiffs, to persuade them to work for Firestone." Id.

2004]

Rethinking Firestone

the question of who is a proper party defendant in an ERISA
benefits claim. ERISA § 502(d)(1) instructs that a plan can sue and
be sued as an entity. 66 Further, § 502(d)(2) provides that a
judgment obtained against a plan as an entity can be enforced only
against the plan entity. 67 If a plan is adequately funded through a
trust, presumably a plan participant can collect any judgment
66
obtained for benefits due under the plan from the trust assets.
Recall, however, that ERISA exempts non-pension employee
benefit plans, such as health care benefit plans and disability
69
benefit plans, from the statute's trust-funding requirements.
What happens if a plan is unfunded-that is, there is no trust
from which to collect a judgment? Did Congress intend ERISA to
foreclose plan participant contract claims against employers who
promise benefits, but who fail to establish a trust to fund such
promises? When a plan is totally unfunded, which is a typical
occurrence in welfare benefit plans, 70 employees have no place to
look but to the employer to satisfy plan promises because there is
no trust res to distribute among plan participants in satisfaction of
71
judgments obtained to recover benefits due under the plan.

66. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1) (2000).
The language states that "[a]ny money judgment
67. Id. § 1132(d)(2).
under this title against an employee benefit plan shall be enforceable only
against the plan as an entity and shall not be enforceable against any other
person unless liability against such other person is established in his
individual capacity under this title." Id.
68. Under trust law, generally a beneficiary must sue the trustee to enforce
a judgment against the trust res. See BOGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS, supra
note 59, § 871, at 174-75 (stating that "in suits involving trust property,
generally both the trustee and all beneficiaries are deemed necessary
parties... and must be joined as parties."). In ERISA, the plan is not the
same thing as the trust that (sometimes) funds the plan, and the plan
administrator, while normally a fiduciary, is not the same thing as a trustee.
Id. § 128. See also Mellor v. Sara Lee Corp., 292 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Miss.
2003) (stating that trustee is proper party defendant, along with
employer/plan administrator, assuming trustee exerted control over the plan).
69. ERISA § 301(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(1) (2000). See also infra notes
185-193 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 136 (1985)
(dealing with unfunded disability benefits plan).
71. ERISA allows welfare plans to be unfunded. ERISA § 301, 29 U.S.C.
In addition, court opinions suggest that ERISA
§ 1081(a)(3) (2000).
§ 502(a)(1)(B) provides the plan participant's exclusive remedy to recover
benefits due under a plan 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000). See Pilot Life Ins.
Co v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987). Further, a judgment against a plan can
only be enforced against that unfunded plan. ERISA § 502(d)(2), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(d)(2) (2000). One of ERISA's main purposes is to assure that plan
participants actually receive promised benefits. See 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 1599 (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("[ERISA's] basic goal is to
assure workers that they will receive the promised pension benefits earned for
This goal would often go
their retirement during their working lives").
woefully unfulfilled if a plan participant could not pursue contract remedies
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Many courts intuitively understand that the employer is
ultimately responsible 'to pay earned employee benefit claims
arising from unfunded plans, 72 even though some courts suggest
that the plan is the only proper defendant in a suit by a plan
participant to recover benefits. 73 Unfortunately, when courts
evaluate benefit claims under a trust law paradigm where no trust
exists, they fail to adhere to the contract law basis for employer
liability. In Section IV, below, we will compare the basis for the
application of contract law versus the application of trust law in
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) claims for benefits arising from unfunded
and insured employee benefit plans.
2.

The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty

Along with the identification and segregation of the trust res,
the preeminent characteristic of a trust relationship is the duty of
loyalty owed by the trustee to trust beneficiaries.74
The
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 provides that: "[t]he trustee
against a plan sponsor who fails to fund an ERISA welfare benefit plan.
Similarly, if plan benefit payments are due from an insurer, a judgment just
against the plan does not give the claimant any enforceable rights against the
responsible party. For example, when the employee benefit is health care
coverage under a group insurance policy, arguably, the employer's promise is
to purchase insurance-to make the premium payment, not to provide the
medical care or even to pay the medical care providers. If the employer
purchases the insurance and the insurer refuses to pay for some untenable
reason (like insolvency), the worker presumably could not pursue a claim
against the employer under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and a judgment solely
against the plan as an entity likely could not be collected as the plan likely
owns no assets except the insurance policy-unless the insurer is a named
defendant, the judgment cannot be enforced against the insurer. See Russell
Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and How to Fix It:
ReinterpretingERISA Preemption, 51 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 457 (2003).
72. See, e.g., Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d
1048, 1050-51 (7th Cir. 1987). In Van Boxel, Judge Posner remarked that "in
the case of defined-benefit pension plans (the vast majority of ERISA plans
and the type involved in this case) the company has contractual obligations
that it must honor whether or not the pension trust is adequately funded." Id.
See also Musmeci v. Schwegmann Giant Super Markets, Inc. 332 F.3d 339,
349-50 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that recovery of benefits generally comes from
the plan, however, employer is also a proper defendant if it decides claims and
funds the plan).
73. See, e.g., Hackner v. Long Term Disability Plan for Employees of Havi
Group LP, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23605 (7th Cir. Nov. 17, 2003) (holding that
although plan granted discretionary authority to make disability benefits
determinations to plan insurer, insurer not a proper party defendant under
ERISA § 502 (d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(2)). See also Hall v. LHACO, Inc., 140
F.3d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing cases). But see Everhardt v. Allamerica
Fin. Life Ins. Co., 275 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2001) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)
(§ 502 (d) merely provides that plan can be sued, but it was not intended to
limit universe of proper defendants in § 502(a)(1)(B) claims for benefits), cert
denied, 536 U.S. 958 (2002).
74. See BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, supra note 59, § 543, at 217.
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is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in
the interest of the beneficiary."7 5 The greatest threat that a
trustee's duty of loyalty might be compromised arises when the
trustee suffers a conflict of interest. Consequently, trust law
generally prohibits the trustee from operating 76under a conflict of
interest and from self-dealing in trust property.
In addition to the problem of applying trust law in ERISA
when there is no trust res, the application of trust law standards
to ERISA benefit claims is further complicated by the statute's
seemingly inconsistent loyalty rules. ERISA imposes a trust law
duty of loyalty on plan administrators, trustees, and other
fiduciaries, 77 yet the statute also allows such fiduciaries to serve
while operating under a conflict of interest. 78 For example, ERISA
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1) (1959).
76. See BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, supra note 59, § 543, at 218-19
("A trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary of the trust to administer the
trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary. The trustee must exclude all
self-interest, as well as the interest of a third party, in his administration of
the trust solely for the benefit of the beneficiary. The trustee must not place
himself in a position where his own interests or that of another enters into
conflict, or may possibly conflict, with the interest of the trust or its
beneficiary. Put another way, the trustee may not enter into a transaction or
take or continue in a position in which his personal interest or the interest of a
third party is or becomes adverse to the interest of the beneficiary."). See also
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.) ("A trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior.").
Judge (later Justice) Cardozo described the trust law review standard
in self-dealing conflicts of interest circumstances as follows:
Finally we are told that the brokers [who sold trust property to a
corporation in which they held a significant interest] acted in good faith,
that the terms procured were the best obtainable at the moment, and
that the wrong, if any, was unaccompanied by damage. This is no
sufficient answer by a trustee forgetful of his duty. The law "does not
stop to inquire whether the contract or transaction was fair or unfair. It
stops the inquiry when the relation is disclosed, and sets aside the
transaction or refuses to enforce it, at the instance of the party whom
the fiduciary undertook to represent, without undertaking to deal with
the question of abstract justice in the particular case." Only by this
uncompromising rigidity has the rule of undivided loyalty been
maintained against disintegrating erosion.
Wendt v. Fischer, 154 N.E. 303, 304 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) (quoting Munson
v. Syracuse, Geneva & Corning R.R., 8 N.E. 355, 358 (N.Y. 1886)).
77. ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000). See also ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
78. ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104; ERISA § 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1108(c)(3) (2000). But see ERISA § 406(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (2000). See
also NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 333 at n.16 (1981) (stating that
"[a]lthough § 408(c)(3) of ERISA permits a trustee of an employee benefit fund
to serve as an agent or representative of the union or employer, that provision
in no way limits the duty of such a person to follow the law's fiduciary
standards while he is performing his responsibilities as trustee").
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expressly authorizes employers, who have ultimate responsibility
to pay employee benefit claims, to serve as plan administrators
who decide whether or not to pay those claims. 79 Additionally, the
statute allows employers to appoint their agents or employees to
serve as plan administrators, who decide which claims the
employer is ultimately responsible to pay when the plan is
unfunded.8 0 Further, insurance companies that pay benefit claims
owed under a plan often serve as the plan administrator who
81
decides whether a plan participant claim should be approved.
Given ERISA's contradictory duty of loyalty directions, it is easy to
understand why courts have struggled when applying trust law
conflict of interest rules to standard of review questions in ERISA
82
benefit claims.
79. ERISA
§ 3(16)(A),
29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(16)(A)
(2000) defines
"administrator" as the person "designated by the terms of the instrument
under which the plan is operated" or, if the plan instrument does not
designate a plan administrator, the plan sponsor. The plan sponsor is usually
the employer or a union. See ERISA § 3(16)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(B)
(2000). See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 105
(1989).
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)(1) (stating that "[a]ny employee benefit plan
may provide-(1) that any person or group of persons may serve in more than
one fiduciary capacity with respect to the plan (including service both as
trustee and administrator) .... ").
81. See, e.g., Dedeaux v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 1311, 1312 (5th Cir.
1985) (ruling on a case where employer purchased group disability insurance
policy from insurer to fund ERISA welfare benefit plan, however, insurer
alone possessed discretion and authority to decide benefit claims), rev'd 481
U.S. 41 (1987). See also Shaw v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 353 F.3d 1276, (11th
Cir. 2003) (plan insurer also serving as claims administrator). Even when
employers appoint themselves as plan administrators under fully insured
plans, they often delegate at least preliminary responsibility to the plan
insurer to process claims. See, e.g., Moon v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 888
F.2d 86 (11th Cir. 1989). Further, as a practical matter, the plan insurer often
controls the claims administration process even when the plan language
reserves final discretionary authority to the employer or plan administrator.
See, e.g., Computer Aided Design Sys. Inc. v. SAFECO Life Ins. Co., 235 F.
Supp. 2d 1052, 1053 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (discussing fact pattern where the
employer was designated as plan administrator and fiduciary "with the sole
authority and responsibility to review and make final decisions on all claims
for benefits" but where stop loss insurer actually controlled claims decisions).
82. A conflict of interest affecting ERISA plan fiduciaries can involve both
bias favoring an employer over employees, for example, where an employer
hires and pays a third-party administrator to process claims, or it can involve
the more sinister self-dealing conflict, for example, where the employer makes
claims decisions directly as the plan administrator. If the employer contracts
with a third party to serve as plan administrator under a renewable
administrative services contract, the plan administrator will have an incentive
to decide controverted benefit claims in favor of the employer in order to curry
favor with the employer to help assure that the contract will be renewed.
When an ERISA plan is unfunded or is funded through the purchase of
insurance, a direct self-dealing conflict of interest often exists. In an unfunded
plan where the employer also serves as the plan administrator (as was the
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Several prominent scholars have examined how a trustee's
conflict of interest impacts the standard of review in ERISA
For purposes of this article, three observations
cases.8 3

case in Firestone), every dollar saved by the plan administrator in denying a
plan participant's claim is a dollar earned by the employer. Similarly, a selfdealing conflict of interest is present when a plan is funded through the
purchase of insurance and the insurance company payor also controls the
claims decisions, whether named as the plan administrator or not. See, e.g.,
Crespo v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 294 F. Supp. 2d 980 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (plan
insurer also serves as plan administrator); Computer Aided Design Sys., Inc.,
235 F. Supp. 2d at 1052 (insurer, though not named as plan administrator,
still controls claims process). Compare Judge Posner's discussion of the
conflict of interest question in Van Boxel, 836 F.2d at 1050-53 (evaluating an
employer's possible conflicts of interest in different circumstances and
endorsing a sliding scale standard of judicial review) with Judge Becker's
discussion of the direct conflict of interest in Bruch, 828 F.2d at 137-45
(employer who serves as plan administrator of unfunded plan suffers a direct,
dollar-for-dollar conflict of interest when making benefit claims decisions),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). See Fought v. UNUM Life
Ins. Co., 357 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2004). See also Muir, supra note 4, at 40610.
83. See Kennedy, supra note 29; Muir, supra note 4; Flint, The Arbitrary
and Capricious Rule under Siege, supra note 29. I favor the analysis,
supported in Justice Stevens opinion in Mass. Mutual Life Insurance Co v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140-43 n.8 (1985), and advanced by Professor Muir of
the University of Michigan. Professor Muir suggests that trust law is best
applied in ERISA, when a plan is funded through a trust, to the trustee's
investment activities and its duty to manage trust assets. Professor Muir
observes, however, that trust law presents a more questionable fit when
applied to benefit claim administration, and urges courts to apply different
review standards to claims that involve asset administration from claims
involving benefit administration. See Muir, supra note 4, at 406. Professor
Muir states:
While pension plans raise asset concerns, prompting Congress to heavily
regulate their terms and funding, health care plans are exempt from
much of ERISA .... The issues that currently plague health care
plans.., have proven to be very different from the problems of asset
administration that so concerned ERISA's drafters. In a health care
plan typically no trust exists to hold assets; instead claims are paid
through an insurance program or, in the case of a self-funded plan, on a
current basis from the general assets of the employer. Therefore,
diversification of plan investments and theft of plan funds do not tend to
be frequent problems. Plan actors have little chance to engage in
opportunistic behavior vis-A-vis plan assets when funds are not
identified to the plan, much less invested for the future payment of
benefit claims.
This does not mean, however, that health care plans do not give rise
to opportunistic behavior by plan actors. Instead, the problematic
behavior that has developed under health care plans and that has
gained widespread attention in recent years is different in character
than what occurred in pension plan operation prior to ERISA. Rather
than issues of asset administration, health care plans spawn issues of
-benefit administration.
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predominate: first, ERISA regulates pension plans and welfare
plans differently; second, ERISA's civil enforcement scheme
provides a variety of remedies, including both legal and equitable
claims; and third, in ERISA, the trust, when employed, serves as a
security instrument to guarantee separate contract promises made
by the employer to its employees. The differences in how ERISA
regulates welfare and pension plans, and the differences within
ERISA's remedies provision impact whether trust law principles
should apply to specific ERISA questions. Further, when courts
fail to recognize that an ERISA trust is not used to implement a
donative transfer, courts ignore the underlying contractual
84
promises which the trust is designed to secure.
B. DeferentialReview of Employee
Benefit Claims Priorto ERISA
1. Employee Benefits as Gratuities
The history of the organized labor movement in the United
States tracks the metamorphosis of our nation from an
agriculturally based economy to an industrial power dominated in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by the steel,
coal, railroad, oil and other heavy industries.8 5 As the country
transformed from a nucleus of the largely self-employed to become
a "nation of employees,"8 6 those new industrial employees, seeking
better working conditions, began to organize in large numbers.
84. See generally Flint, Reformulating the Federal Common Law for Plan
Interpretation, supra note 4 (describing participants' dependence on
traditional equitable remedies of the common law of trusts). See also Conison,
supra note 4 (reiterating the same rationale). Similarly, when a plan is
insured, obligations under the insurance contract should be governed by
insurance contract law principles. See ERISA §§ 403(b)(1) and (2), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1103(b)(1) and (2) (2000) (exempting insurance contracts from ERISA's
trust requirements), and ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)
(2000) (saving state insurance laws from ERISA preemption).
85. See generally Jay Conison, Foundations of the Law of Plans,41 DEPAUL
L. REV. 575 (1992) (tracing the development of the pension industry to
summarize the early development of employee benefits law) [hereinafter
Conison, Foundations]. Professor Conison relies on numerous histories and
reports including WILLIAM GRAEBNER, A HISTORY OF RETIREMENT: THE
MEANING AND FUNCTION OF RETIREMENT IN AMERICA, 1885-1978 (1980); W.
ANDREW ACHENBAUM, OLD AGE IN THE NEW LAND: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE SINCE 1790 (1978); MURRAY W. LATIMER, INDUSTRIAL PENSION
SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1932); and LOUIS D. BRANDEIS,

BUSINESS - A PROFESSION (1914). See Conison, Foundations at 581-89. See
also JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
LAW 1-67 (3d ed. 2000); STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS:
THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS (1997); ROBERT A. GORMAN, LABOR LAW:
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1-6 (1976) (collectively
illustrating the history of labor law in the United States).
86. BRANDEIS, supra note 85, at 65-66. See SASS, supra note 85, at 6-33.
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One of the most significant dilemmas the growing class of
industrial workers presented to employers and society was the
need to accommodate the older workers' perceived declining
productivity and his or her need for economic security post
employment.
It is well documented that labor's initial efforts to band
together in order to achieve improved compensation and working
conditions met resistance from employers, and from the courts in
the United States.8 7 Labor's attempts to unite in the nineteenth
century exposed workers engaged in strikes, picketing, and
boycotts to criminal prosecution under common law conspiracy
charges.8 8
Following a relatively short duration of criminal
prosecution of striking and boycotting workers,8 9 employers turned
to civil anti-trust laws, and particularly to the remedy of
injunction, in order to combat organized labor. 90 Employers
successfully attacked labor activities under the Sherman Antitrust
Act 91 obtaining restraining orders that prohibited strikes and
boycotts, and subjecting union organizers to treble damage
awards. 92 In 1914, Congress passed the Clayton Act 93 to overturn
court interpretations which applied the Sherman Act to union
87. JULIUS G. GETMAN & JOHN D. BLACKBURN, LABOR RELATIONS: LAW
PRACTICE AND POLICY 1-17 (2d ed. 1983); ALVIN L. GOLDMAN, THE SUPREME
COURT AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS LAW 5-22 (1976).

88. Perhaps the most prominent example historically, is the 1806
PhiladelphiaCordwainers' case, where a group of shoemakers struck in an
effort to increase their wages. The cordwainers were convicted of conspiracy
due to the workers combination of efforts. The court's instructions to the jury
declared that "a combination of workers to raise their wages may be
considered in a twofold point of view; one is to benefit themselves, the other is
to injure those who do not join their society. The rule of law condemns both."
See GETNER & BLACKBURN, supra note 87, at 1-2 (recounting court's
instructions); Commonwealth v. Pullis, (Philadelphia Mayor's Court 1806),
reported in 3 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
59-236 (John Commons & Eugene Gilmore eds., 1910).
89. See generally Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45. Metc. (4 Mass) 111, 38 Am.
Dec. 346 (1842) (ordering criminal indictment charging the formation of a
union as a criminal conspiracy dismissed, as charge must be supported by
evidence of either an illegal purpose or the use of illegal means to obtain a
lawful purpose).
90. See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNCTION (1930), and GORMAN, supra note 85, at 1-6.
91. 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2002)).

92. In 1908, the United States Supreme Court upheld an employer's right
to pursue a claim against the United Hatters of North America, a union of hat
making workers under the auspicious of American Federation of Labor, and
its President, Samuel Gompers, that the union's activity, which protested a
hat manufacturer's payment of below union wages by organizing a boycott of
the hat maker's product, asserting that the union's activity constituted an
unlawful restraint of trade. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 235 U.S. 522, 533-36 (1915).
See also Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
93. 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
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activities, but narrow court applications of the Clayton Act
94
rendered that statute ineffective in protecting labor unions.
Finally, in 1935, Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act 95
which effectively prevented employers from obtaining injunctions
against union strikes and boycotts under the claim that such
96
activities constituted violations of anti-trust law.
Labor's relative lack of power at the turn of the 20th century
is reflected in the early development of the common law of pension
benefits. Prior to the industrial revolution, employers tended to
deal with aging workers on a case by case basis, perhaps finding
less demanding jobs for some older workers, or rewarding some
loyal workers with the equivalent of retirement benefits. 97 As
employers faced the problems inherent with aging workers in an
industrial workforce for the first time on a large scale, 98 more
systematic methods had to be developed to cope with workers who
no longer contributed economic value relative to younger
workers. 99 Slowly, employers began to offer formal retirement
plans for their workers, 100 however, when workers challenged
94. See generally Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
95. 47 Stat. 90 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
(2003)).
96. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (noting that
"[t]he Norris-LaGuardia Act was a disapproval of Duplex PrintingPress Co. v.
Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) and Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone
Cutters'Ass'n., 274 U.S. 37 (1927), as the authoritative interpretation of § 20
of the Clayton Act, for Congress now placed its own meaning upon that
section. The Norris-LaGuardia Act reasserted the original purpose of the
Clayton Act by infusing into it the immunized trade union activities as
redefined by the later Act.").
97. Conison, Foundations,supra note 85, at 583-84. See also FRANKFURTER
& GREENE, supra note 90, at 2. Before the Civil War, and before the mass
exodus of the worker population to industrial and factory jobs, employers did
not face the problem of the aging worker on a large scale. In addition to
shorter life expectancies in the nineteenth century, the development of the
frontier drove a westward migration which also contributed to a more
transient work force and a relative scarcity of workers who remained as longtime employees for a single employer. LATIMER, supra note 85, at 20-60,
quoted in Conison, Foundations,supra note 85, at 582-83. SASS, supra note 85,
at 23-25.
98. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 85, at 3-6 (citing statistics which
indicate that between 1900 and 1984 life expectancy in the United- States
increased from forty-seven years to seventy-five years).
99. Conison, Foundations, supra note 85, at 585-86 n,47 (citing Bowler v.
Nagel, 200 N.W. 258, 260 (Mich. 1924)). See Sigman v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co.,
11 N.E. 2d 878, 878-80 (Ohio App. 1937).
100. See Conison, Foundations,supra note 85, at 584 n.37 (citing STUART D.
BRANDES, AMERICAN WELFARE CAPITALISM 103-05 (1976)) (reporting the slow
development of the use of private pension in the United States leading up to
the twentieth century, and then the more rapid growth of the private pension
industry beginning during the First World War). S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 2-7,
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4839-43, and in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 587-93; H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 2-5 (1973), reprinted in 1974
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employer action in canceling benefit programs, 101 or altering
10 3
eligibility requirements, 102 or just denying particular claims,
courts failed to recognize employee contract rights to such
benefits.104
Courts initially viewed employer provided retirement plans as
gifts to the workers which the employer could alter in its
discretion, or at its whim. 105 Additionally, when employers set
aside money or assets to fund such retirement plans, courts held
that the fund was the property of the employer, with which the
employer could do as it pleased.106 Seemingly predicting the
Firestone dicta half a century before ERISA's enactment,
employers often drafted their retirement plans so as to reserve to
the employer discretion to change the terms of the plan and the
absolute right to make benefit determinations. 07 Courts strictly
enforced such benefit plan language leaving employers in control
of employee benefits because individual workers did not have the
bargaining power to negotiate the terms of their fringe benefit
programs. 08
Workers, of course, felt deceived when an employer failed to
provide benefits according to the workers' expectations.
Employees suggested that they were induced to spend their best
work years in service for the employer upon the promise that the
employer would provide for them in retirement. While some
U.S.C.C.A.N 4639, 4640-43, and in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at
2349-52; 120 CONG. REC. 29,933-35 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 4746-51 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
101. See, e.g., Cowles v. Morris & Co., 161 N.E. 150 (Ill. 1928) (upholding the
cancellation of a pension plan upon the finding that employees have no vested
right to the employers' money).
102. See, e.g., Beutel v. Foreman, 123 N.E. 270 (1ll. 1919) (dealing with
Police Pension Fund Act).
103. See, e.g., McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 98 (App. Div. 1898),
affd mem. 60 N.E. 1115 (N.Y. 1901).
104. Professor Jay Conison, in his examination of the common law
foundations of employee pension plans, cites numerous examples of written
pension programs containing language declaring the benefits to be awarded
solely at the discretion of the employer, and without any right of the worker to
seek review of the employer's decision to deny the benefit. See Conison,
Foundations,supra note 85, at 590-93 (citing Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d
786, 790 (8th Cir. 1944); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Butler, 86 S.W. 2d 258,
262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Cowles, 161 N.E. at 152; Fickling v. Pollard, 179
S.E. 582, 582-83 (Ga. App. 1935); McNevin, 53 N.Y.S. at 99).
105. See, e.g., Menke, 140 F.2d at 790. Conison, Foundations,supra note 85,
at 589-98.
106. See Conison, Foundations, supra note 85, at 590-98 (discussing the
treatment of a pension plan as employer property).
107. See Menke, 140 F.2d at 790 (citing various cases). See also SASS, supra
note 85, at 34.
108. Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire
Contract in the Federal Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56 OHIO ST. L.J.
153 (1995); Conison, Foundations,supra note 85, at 592-98.
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employer's surely acted out of altruistic motivations in
establishing fringe benefit plans, the growth in the number of
pension plans during the Twentieth Century reflects the beneficial
aspects to employers of providing pension programs for their
employees.10 9 Employers offer retirement benefits as an incentive
to attract good young workers, and to maintain a stable group of
employees. 110 The genesis of the employee benefit as contract
right emerged from the expectations employees developed as a
quid pro quo for accepting employment and remaining loyal and
hard-working over a course of years and for deferring
compensation until retirement."'
2. National Labor Laws, Designed to Achieve IndustrialPeace,
Promote Collective Bargaining
Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA),11 2 commonly known as the Wagner Act, in 1935 to create
a statutory right for workers to organize and assert collective
strength in contract negotiations with employers, and more
broadly to encourage union representation and collective
bargaining. 1 3 In the Wagner Act, Congress endorsed the concept
of a bargaining unit, chosen by a majority of the employees within
the unit, to serve as bargaining agent for the union workers. The
109. Conison, Foundations,supra note 85, at 598-609.
110. See Bowler, 200 N.W. at 260 (stating that "[t]he object of the corporation
expending its money for pensions is continuity of service, or increasing the
continuity of service, decreasing the turn-over of employees, making it an
object for them to stay with us.... In my opinion it is an economic advantage
to the company in providing this pension system for our employees; that is our
real reason for setting aside the funds and making the expenditure for the
pension. I believe the pension produces greater faithfulness on the part of the
employee. The question of labor turn-over is an item of considerable expense
to an industrial concern; it is very much to the advantage of the company to
have employees in continuous employment. We look upon the pension as
compensation for long service.") (quoted in Conison, Foundations supra note
85, at 588 n.47)).
111. See generally Conison, Foundations, supra note 85, at 575-618
(commenting on emergence of employee benefit contract right). Compare Van
Horn v. Lewis, 79 F. Supp. 541, 544 (D.D.C. 1948) (holding that benefit
promises funded through LMRA trust are gratuities) with Hobbs v. Lewis, 159
F. Supp. 282, 286 (D.D.C. 1958) (fringe benefits provided through LMRA plan
are in the nature of deferred compensation which employees have contractual
right to receive).
112. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (West
2004)).
113. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000). As part of the NLRA, Congress created the
National Labor Relations Board, 29 U.S.C. § 153, an administrative agency
designed to implement the NLRA's unfair labor practices provisions, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158, and the union election and representation provisions, 29 U.S.C. § 159.
Prior to the NLRA, the National War Labor Board, created by Executive Order
No. 9017, 7 Fed. Reg. 237 (Jan. 12, 1942) recognized workers rights to
organize and bargain collectively, free from employer interference.
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NLRA worked to encourage a system of self-government in labormanagement relations, 114 with the purpose of promoting industrial
peace, and advanced through a preference for settlement of labormanagement disputes by "the processes of conference and
collective bargaining between employers and the representatives
115
of their employees."
The collective bargaining process and resulting selfgovernment of labor disputes established under the NLRA
sacrificed individual rights for labors' presumed collective good.
The union negotiated with management on behalf of a group of
workers. Individual workers, of course, may have disagreed with
the will of the group; however, the collective bargaining process
established the union as the exclusive bargaining agent for
labor." 6 Congress quickly reinforced its choice to serve labors'
collective good rather than to focus on individual employee
protections when it adopted the Labor Management Relations Act
amendments to the Wagner Act in 1947.11 7 While the Wagner Act
114. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580
(1960) (noting Congressional encouragement of collective bargaining intended
to erect a system of self-government).
115. Id. at 581-82. Consequently, courts have favored the enforcement of
arbitration agreements contained in negotiated labor agreements. Further,
the arbitration award resulting from a collectively bargained agreement will
generally be enforced without review, unless the arbitrator based the award
on something other than the labor agreement. Id. See generally Theodore J.
Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at
Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137 (1977).
116. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000). See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967) (stating that a union acting as exclusive bargaining agent for workers
has a duty to fairly represent all employees in the negotiation and
administration of a collective bargaining agreement). See generally Conison,
Suits for Benefits, supra note 4, at 19-20.
117. The LMRA amendments included revised methods for resolving union
representation disputes, established a list of unfair labor practices by labor
organizations, and restructured the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
29 U.S.C. §§ 153-159.
See generally Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs &
Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Archibald Cox, Some
Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (pts. 1 & 2), 61 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1947), 61 HARV. L. REV. 274 (1948).
An additional major amendment, known as the Landrum-Griffin Act,
occurred in 1959. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 86 Pub.
L. No. 257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 401).
Together, the Wagner Act, the Taft-Hartley Act, and the Landrum-Griffim Act
comprise the major body of federal regulation directing labor-management
relations in the private sector prior to ERISA's regulation of employee
benefits. See ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 1 (1976). The
NLRA does not govern farm workers, public employees, or railroad and airline
workers. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2000). Union activities in the railroad and airline
industries are regulated by the Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 578 (1926)
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (2000). Developments in the law
under the Railway Labor Act influenced subsequent labor legislation and case
law governing labor-management relations under the NLRA. See generally
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declared a public policy favoring collective bargaining, the NLRA
did not address enforcement of collectively bargained contracts.
The LMRA corrected that deficiency for the union and the
employer; however, it did not create any express remedies for
individual workers to enforce their rights under collectively
8
bargained contracts. 11
3. The LMRA Does Not Provide an Express Remedy for
Individual Union Members to Recover Benefits Due Under a
Collectively BargainedLaborAgreement
The LMRA established a basis to enforce collectively
bargained labor agreements by expressly granting labor unions
and management the right to sue in federal court to enforce each
party's contract rights. LMRA § 301 (a) instructs that "suits for
violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization ... may be brought in any district of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties."'119 Absent a binding
arbitration agreement, 120 both the labor union and the employer
can sue under LMRA § 301 to enforce Taft-Hartley agreements. In
contrast to the way courts currently process ERISA benefit
claims, 121 in LMRA § 301 lawsuits, the rules of civil procedure
David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61
CAL. L. REV. 663, 676-86 (1973).
118. See LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (granting express remedy to a union
and to an employer, but not to individual workers). See generally Archibald
Cox, Rights under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REV. 601 (1956); Archibald
Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1482 (1959);
Archibald Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1958).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). States have concurrent jurisdiction to hear LMRA
§ 301 suits, but state court judges must apply federal law in such proceedings.
See Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Charles Dowd
Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). LMRA § 301(a) can be viewed as a
rejection of the enforcement procedures Congress applied under the Railway
Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. 151), which
created the National Railway Adjustment Board to determine disputes
involving the interpretation of labor agreements between railroad workers and
their employers. The National Railway Adjustment Board's decisions were
deemed final and binding, except as to monetary awards. As to monetary
awards, the statute authorized suit in federal courts to order compliance with
the Board's orders, where such orders and findings were "prima facie evidence
of the facts stated therein." Id.; Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago
River & Ind. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
120. Most collective bargaining agreements contain clauses requiring
arbitration of contract disputes. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486
U.S. 399, 411 n.ll (1988) (quoting BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC. BASIC
PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 37 (11th ed. 1986) (stating that "Arbitration
is called for in 99 percent of the sample contracts.")).
121. See generally DeBofsky, supranote 14 (criticizing courts in ERISA cases
for deciding ERISA benefit claims based upon an "administrative record"); see
Consion, supra note 4, at 21-33 (exposing the myth of judicial review when
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apply, trials are conducted de novo, and the right to a jury trial
pertains.122
Notably absent in LMRA § 301 is an express right of action

for individual workers to enforce their rights arising from
collectively bargained labor agreements. Prior to ERISA, which
grants both union and non-union workers the express right to sue
for benefits due under an employee benefit plan, individual
workers denied benefits under a collectively bargained labor
contract faced significant jurisdictional obstacles in attempting to
obtain judicial relief. 123 Workers could ask the union to bring their
individual grievances to the employer, but if a union failed to
pursue an individual worker's grievance, many courts held that
the employee's only remedy was against the union for not fairly
representing the worker's interests. 124 As a result of the failure of
the LMRA to expressly authorize individual worker suits, union
members struggled under the LMRA to find a legal theory which
125
would allow them to enforce their individual claims for benefits.
courts fail to consider evidence and require exhaustion of "administrative
remedies").
122. See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494
U.S. 558 (1990); Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 436
F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1970). See also Stamps v. Mich. Teamsters Joint Council
No. 43, 431 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (granting ERISA plan participant a
jury trial in a claim for benefits suit under § 502(a)(1)(B) by analogizing
ERISA benefit claims to LMRA § 301 claims which are heard de novo and with
right to jury).
123. See generally Annot., Right of IndividualEmployee to Enforce Collective
Labor Agreement Against Employer, 18 A.L.R. 2d 352 (Supp. 2003).
124. See, e.g., Haley v. Palatnik, 378 F. Supp. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on
other grounds, 509 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1975). The duty of fair representation
under the NLRA derives from a union's exclusive authority to represent all
employees in a bargaining unit. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local 391 v.
Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 563 (1990). The procedure developed under the LMRA
typically established a collective-bargaining agreement which contained a
quasi-administrative enforcement procedure. If employees complained about
an employer's denial of benefits, the employee was required to submit a
grievance to his or her union. The union then would decide whether to present
the grievance to the employer. If the union did file a grievance on behalf of a
worker, the agreed procedure often, but not always, required the parties to
then arbitrate the dispute. The arbitrator's ruling was deemed final, except
for a challenge that the arbitrator relied on something outside the bargaining
agreement to decide the claim. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior Gulf Nav.
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). See also Chauffeurs, 494 U.S. at 564 (stating that
"[blecause most collective-bargaining agreements accord finality to grievance
or arbitration procedures established by the collective-bargaining agreement,
an employee normally cannot bring an LMRA § 301 action against an
employer unless he can show that the union breached its duty of fair
representation in its handling of his grievance." (citing DelCostello v.
Teamsters, 461 U.S. 151, 163-64 (1983)).
125. See Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955) (holding that Congress did not confer on the federal
courts jurisdiction to hear suits by a union suing on behalf of union members
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4. The "StructuralDefect" Basis for Jurisdictionin Claims Under
LMRA § 302
LMRA § 302 requires that all payments made by an employer
126
or a union to fund an employee benefit plan be held in trust.
Further, the statute requires that Taft-Hartley trustees apply
trust assets for the exclusive benefit of covered workers. 127 In
response to court decisions holding that the Taft-Hartley Act did
not provide an express private remedy for individual union
members, 128 workers urged courts to imply an individual remedy
for breach of the trust law exclusive benefit rule codified in LMRA
§ 302. Employees asserted that when LMRA trustees denied
benefit claims based upon specific plan language, that the plan, as
structured, violated § 302's requirement that trust assets be
applied solely for the benefit of plan beneficiaries.129 A number of
federal courts accepted the LMRA § 302 "structural defect" theory
of liability and relied upon that implied remedy to support federal
3 0
court jurisdiction to hear individual employee benefit claims.
While the structural defect basis of liability and jurisdiction
allowed workers to enter the federal courthouse, because the
action arose under the trust law-based exclusive benefit rule,
courts hearing employee benefit claims under LMRA § 302 applied
to recover accrued wages), discredited in, Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371
U.S. 195, 198 (1962).
126. See LMRA § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (2000).
127. Id. The LMRA includes protections to prevent a party biased toward
either the employees or the employer from controlling a Taft-Hartley trust.
Specifically, the LMRA requires that both the employees and the employer
appoint an equal number of trustees to administer the Taft-Hartley trust.
LMRA § 302(c)(5)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (2000). Additionally, the LMRA
details a procedure for the selection of a neutral umpire to decide issues when
the trustees deadlock. Id. Despite the requirement of equal representation on
the board, some suggest that unions have exerted undue control over TaftHartley multi-employer plans. SASS, supra note 85, at 181.
128. See generally McCreary, The Arbitrary & Capricious Standard under
ERISA, supra note 29, at 1037-41.
129. See, e.g., Insley v. Joyce, 330 F. Supp. 1228, 1231-32 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
See also McCreary, supra note 29, at 1039-40 n.20 (citing Music v. W.
Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 712 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1983);
Hurn v. Ret. Fund of Plumbing, Heating & Piping Indus., 703 F.2d 386 (9th
Cir. 1983); Lugo v. Employees Ret. Fund of Illumination Prod. Indus., 529
F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1976)). Professor Jay Conison suggests that Mr. McCreary's
conclusion that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review in employee
benefit cases originated with the LMRA structural defect cases is flawed.
Conison, supra note 4, at n.117. While Professor Conison establishes that
courts applied a deferential standard of review in pension cases before the
enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, Mr. McCreary's point that courts hearing
ERISA cases looked to LMRA decisions as a guide in applying the deferential
standard of review in ERISA benefit claims appears well founded. Van Boxel
v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1987);
Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 140-45 (3d Cir. 1987).
130. See generally McCreary, supra note 29.
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13 1
a deferential trust law-based standard of review.
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions provide specific
remedies for both union and non-union workers challenging
132
benefit denials under employment provided benefit plans.
Additionally, ERISA's legislative history indicates that Congress
borrowed to some extent from the LMRA when it drafted
ERISA.133 Consequently, when union members filed claims under
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), courts applied the same standard of review
that they had been applying in LMRA § 302 claims brought by
individual workers, without stopping to compare the express
remedy provided in ERISA to the implied trust law-based
134
structural defect claim.
In most of the early ERISA benefit claim cases, courts
followed the LMRA precedent of deferring to fiduciaries' decisions
without serious consideration of the legal basis supporting a
deferential standard of review under the ERISA law.' 35 Slowly,
however, some courts began to express concern over the
transparent unfairness in deferring to an ERISA plan
administrator's decisions when a plan participant exposed the
plan administrator's conflict of interest.1 36 In Bruch v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 13 7 Circuit Judge Edward R. Becker finally
analyzed the LMRA origins of the deferential standard of review
in ERISA cases and found that the LMRA analogy did not fit

131. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109-10 (stating that "Federal courts adopted
the 'structural defect' theory of liability in LMRA § 302 suits both as a review
standard, and more importantly, as a means of asserting jurisdiction over
suits under LMRA § 186(c) by beneficiaries of LMRA plans who were denied
benefits by trustees"). But see Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund v.
Demisay, 508 U.S. 581 (1993) (rejecting the structural defect basis for
jurisdiction and liability under LMRA § 302).
132. ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000). One of the express reasons
Congress cited as evidence of the need to reform the private pension industry
was the failure of pre-existing state and federal law, including the LMRA, to
adequately protect individual rights to enforce benefit promises. See SEN.
REP. No. 93-127, at 4-7, 28-29, 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N 4838
and in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 590-93, 614-15, 621.
133. See H.R. CONF. REP. 93-1280, 93rd CONG., at 327 (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N 4639, 5107, and in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at
4594 (stating that "all such actions [under § 502(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits
due under an ERISA plan] are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the
United States in similar fashion to those brought under Section 301 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.").
134. See Bruch, 828 F.2d at 143 (citing Bayles v. Cent. States Pension Fund,
602 F.2d 97, 99-100 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979); Bueneman v. Cent. States Pension
Fund, 572 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1978)).
135. Bruch, 828 F.2d at 138-39.
136. See, e.g., Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 711-12 (9th Cir. 1985);
Struble v. N.J. Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 333 (3d
Cir. 1984).
137. 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987).
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ERISA's circumstances. 138
III. FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER CO. V. BRUCH: PLAN
PARTICIPANTS WIN THE BATTLE AND LOSE THE WAR
A.

The FirestonePlan was Unfunded

In 1980, Firestone Tire & Rubber Company sold its Plastics
Division to Occidental Petroleum Company. At the time of the
sale, Firestone sponsored an ERISA-governed employee benefit
plan, known as the Termination Pay plan, which promised
severance benefits to any employee if Firestone discharged the
139
worker from employment because of a "reduction in work force."
Six Plastics Division workers who lost their jobs with
Firestone as a result of the sale to Occidental, but who were re40
hired by Occidental, sought severance benefits from Firestone.
Firestone refused the employees' demands for benefits based upon
its interpretation that the separation of a group of employees from
the company due to the sale of the Plastics Division did not
amount to a "reduction in work force" within the meaning of the
Termination Pay Plan.
Firestone did not realize ERISA governed the Termination
Pay Plan. 4 1
Consequently, it did not comply with ERISA's
formalities in operating the plan. 42 In particular, Firestone
neglected to appoint a plan administrator for the Termination Pay
plan.
As a result, Firestone itself became the plan
administrator 43 and the plan fiduciary 144 under ERISA's default
appointment rules. 145 Additionally, Firestone did not separately
138. Id. at 143-46.
139. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 105-06 (1989).
140. Id. Apparently, Occidental paid the same wages as Firestone, but the
parties disagreed about whether the fringe benefits offered by Occidental were
comparable to the benefits Firestone employees received. Id. See Brief of the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2 n.1, Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (No. 87-1054) [hereafter
United States Amicus Brief] available in LEXIS at 1987 U.S. Briefs 1054.
141. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 105. Firestone's claim of innocent ignorance is
belied somewhat by the fact that it also failed to follow ERISA's funding
requirements in establishing its separate pension plan. Id.
142. Id. ERISA directs that every employee benefit plan shall be established
and maintained pursuant to a written instrument and that such instrument
shall appoint one or more named fiduciaries who shall administer the plan.
ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2000). Additionally, Firestone did
not establish an internal claims process or appeals process as required by
ERISA, and it did not comply with ERISA's reporting and disclosure
requirements. ERISA § 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031, 1133 (2000).
143. ERISA § 3(16)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A)(ii) (2000).
144. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
145. ERISA § 3(16)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A)(ii) and ERISA § 3(21)(A),
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
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fund the severance benefit plan. 146 Together, Firestone's failure to
fund the plan and its default appointment as plan administrator
placed Firestone in direct conflict with its employees in claims
arising from the severance plan. Since Firestone had both the
contractual responsibility to pay the employee benefits, and the
power as the default plan administrator to decide whether to
approve claims, every decision Firestone made to deny a plan
participant's benefit claim resulted in a direct, dollar-for-dollar
gain for the employer.147
The former Firestone workers sued under ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits allegedly due to them under the
terms of the Firestone severance plan. 148 Despite Firestone's
admitted failure to comply with ERISA, the district court held that
the Termination Pay plan was an ERISA welfare benefit plan, but
then entered summary judgment against the workers. Based upon
the prevailing authority from many circuits, 149 the district judge
believed he could not interfere with a plan administrator's
interpretation of an ERISA plan, unless the administrator acted
arbitrarily. 50
The district judge found that Firestone's

146. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 105. Firestone's failure to fund the Termination
Pay plan, in and of itself, did not violate ERISA, but it significantly impacted
Judge Becker's standard of review analysis in his Third Circuit decision
because it starkly presented the unfairness to plan participants when courts
deferred to one of the contracting parties' interpretation of contract provisions.
Bruch, 828 F.2d at 144-45.
147. Bruch, 828 F.2d at 144. The Firestone conflict is typical of contracts
where the law assumes self-interest motivates each of the parties to the
contract. The presumed self-interest of contracting parties is the reason why
courts apply de novo review under contract law, deferring to neither party's
interpretation of contract terms. The conflict of interest reflected in Firestone
is not the usual circumstance under a trust where the settlor typically places
funds under the control of a neutral trustee to fund a promise (or gift) made to
the beneficiary. Under trust law, the trustee must adhere to a duty of loyalty
owed to the beneficiaries and must generally avoid any conflicting interest.
Since the trustee is presumed to be free of self-interest, courts defer to the
non-conflicted trustees exercise of discretionary powers. One of the most
confounding problems in ERISA is the difficulty in applying trust law
principles, which are based on the presumption that the trustee is not
motivated by self-interest, where the statute expressly allows plan fiduciaries
to serve while suffering a self-interested conflict of interest.
148. Bruch, 828 F.2d at 136-37. The workers also sought statutory damages
resulting from Firestone's alleged failure to provide information concerning
their benefits package in violation of ERISA. Id. Additional claims for
increased retirement benefits, vacation benefits, and the right to participate in
a stock purchase benefit plan were apparently settled. United States Amicus
Brief, supra note 140, at 2 n.3.
149. See Bruch, 828 F.2d at 138 (citing cases).
150. Id. at 137. District Judge Daniel H. Huyett apparently applied some
form of sliding scale judicial review of Firestone's claim denial due to
Firestone's conflict of interest.
Though Judge Huyett concluded that
Firestone's interpretation was not arbitrary or capricious, he stated that
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interpretation of the "reduction in work force" language was not
arbitrary or capricious.
B. The Third Circuit Questioned the Basis for
Applying a Deferential Standardof Review
In Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 1 5 1 the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the district court's award of summary
judgment to Firestone because the trial court did not adequately
account for Firestone's conflict of interest when it applied an
arbitrary and capricious standard in reviewing the former
employees' severance benefit claims. 152 Judge Becker's opinion in
Bruch laboriously traced the origins of the arbitrary and
capricious review standard as applied in ERISA, first to the
ERISA decisions importing the standard from LMRA cases, 53 and
then to the LMRA cases which imported the standard from the
common law of trusts. 5 4 While Judge Becker concluded that the
trust law-based standard of review applied to ERISA benefit
claims, he distinguished the application of trust law under ERISA
from trust law applied under the LMRA and ruled that when an
ERISA trustee operates under a conflict of interest, courts should
155
apply a de novo review of benefit claim denials.
Judge Becker's opinion establishes that when courts first
imported the LMRA deferential standard of review as the
paradigm to review ERISA benefit claim denials, those courts
failed to recognize a fundamental difference in the operation of
Taft-Hartley trusts and trusts established under ERISA.156 The
Taft-Hartley Act requires that trusts established under collective
bargaining agreements to fund pension benefits be administered
by a neutral board of trustees. 5 7 In contrast, the employer who is
ultimately responsible to pay promised benefits owed to ERISA
plan participants also controls the selection of the plan
administrator who decides claims, with no input from the plan
"because Firestone avoided the outlay of a substantial amount of money by
denying plaintiffs termination pay... [the court] may scrutinize the decision
more closely." Petitioner's Brief at 3, Firestone, (No. 87-1054) (hereinafter,
Petitioner's Brief), available in LEXIS at 1987 U.S. Briefs 1054.
151. 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987).
152. Id. at 145.
153. Id. at 140-41, 143-45.
154. Id. at 142-43.
155. Id. at 136.
156. Id. at 138-39. Here Judge Becker assumed that Firestone funded its
severance plan through the establishment of a trust, which it did not.
Elsewhere in the opinion Judge Becker emphasized that the Firestone plan
was unfunded in order to establish the plan administrator's conflict of interest,
but he failed to take the next logical step and hold that trust law should not be
applied at all when there is no trust.
See infra notes 194-207 and
accompanying text.
157. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (2000).
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members. 158 The ERISA plan administrator, therefore, is never
really neutral, and that is particularly true when the plan sponsor
and the plan administrator are the same entity, either because the
employer appointed itself, or a committee of its employees, to serve
as plan administrator, or because ERISA's default appointment
rules apply. 159 As a result of the inherent conflict of interest
existing when a plan sponsor also serves as the plan
administrator, which the Firestone facts presented most
dramatically, the Third Circuit accorded no deference to the plan
60
administrator's benefits decision under trust law principles.
Judge Becker's Third Circuit opinion ably discredited the
blind application of LMRA standard of review precedents to
ERISA benefit claims. Judge Becker also appropriately grounded
his trust law analysis in Comment g to the Restatement (Second)
1 61
of Trusts § 187 dealing with a trustee's improper motive.
Unfortunately, Judge Becker overlooked one additional and crucial
difference between ERISA and the LMRA which impacts the
application of trust law. In ERISA, welfare benefit plans are
exempt from the statute's trust funding requirements. 162 The
Third Circuit Bruch opinion remains unsatisfying because the
opinion failed to recognize the paradigmatic inconsistency of
applying trust law, rather than contract law, to govern ERISA
benefit claims when the benefit plan under consideration is not

158. Bruch, 828 F.2d at 144.
159. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psyhcare Serv., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 674
(Cal. 2000) (holding that for the arbitration clause in a consumer contract to
be enforceable, the arbitration must meet certain minimum requirements of
fairness, including the neutrality of the arbitrator, a provision for adequate
discovery, a written decision that permits a limited form of judicial review,
and limitations on costs of arbitration); Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips,
173 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that an arbitration clause is
unenforceable where an employer who drafted the arbitration agreement
created circumstance where it controlled who was on the panel of approved
arbitrators).
160. Bruch, 828 F.2d at 145. The court stated that "[t]he principles of trust
law instruct that when a trustee is thought to have acted in his own interest
and contrary to the interest of beneficiaries, his decisions are to be scrutinized
with the greatest possible care. 'Uncompromising rigidity has been the
attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided
loyalty."' Id. at 145 (citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928)).
161. Bruch, 828 F.2d at 141. Where the employer funds a plan through a
trust and also serves as the ERISA plan administrator and fund trustee or
where the employer appoints a committee of its employees to serve as plan
administrator and fund trustee, courts evaluating the conflict of interest
should apply trust law's self-dealing rules. Under the common law of trusts,
where a trustee is conflicted due to self-interest or self-dealing, courts apply
the no-further-inquiry rule. Judge Cardozo's famous recitation of the rule is
contained in Wendt v. Fischer, 154 N.E. 303 (N.Y. 1926), and is quoted supra
note 76.
162. See infra notes 185-193 and accompanying text.
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funded through a trust.163
The Bruch opinion is especially
disappointing because Judge Becker acknowledged the trust law
versus contract law debate among the District of Columbia judges
who decided the early LMRA cases, 164 but he failed to examine
that question in the ERISA benefit claim before the Court in
Bruch.
The most substantial discussion of the overlapping
application of trust law and contract law in claims arising from
Taft-Hartley trusts examined by Judge Becker appears in Kennet
v. United Mine Workers of America.165 In Kennet, Judge Holtzoff

163. Bruch, 828 F.2d at 136. Judge Becker carefully recited that Firestone
never established a trust to fund its promises to provide benefits. Bruch, 828
F.2d at 136. However, despite the Judge's focus on the significance of the lack
of a funding mechanism in creating Firestone's conflict of interest under trust
law, Judge Becker never made the underlying connection that when an ERISA
plan is unfunded, that means there is no trust and no trustee. Id. at 144-45.
Absent a trust res and a trustee, trust law cannot apply.
164. See Bruch, 828 F.2d at 139-43 (citing Kennet v. United Mineworkers of
Am., 183 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1960) (Holtzoff, J.); Ruth v. Lewis, 166 F. Supp.
346 (D.D.C. 1958) (Youngdahl, J.); Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F. Supp. 282 (D.D.C.
1958) (Pine, J)). These early LMRA cases cited by Judge Becker which
addressed the standard of review question, were all litigated in the District
Court for the District of Columbia, and all involved claims arising from the
United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund.
165. 183 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1960). See generally Langbein, Basis of the
Law of Trusts, supra note 30; FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANNIEL R. FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw (1991). In Van Horn v. Lewis,
79 F. Supp. 541 (D.D.C. 1948), the first LMRA case to mention the standard of
review question, District of Columbia Judge Goldsborough characterized the
United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund as a
charitable trust. Id. at 544. Applying trust law doctrine, Judge Goldsborough
found that no power existed with the courts to interfere with the reasonable
acts of the fund trustees. Id. at 546. Judge Goldsborough's writing style,
while revealing his stream of conscience, is perhaps not as precise as one
might like, consequently, the foundational basis for his opinion is somewhat
murky. Other District of Columbia District Judges subsequently rejected
Judge Goldsborough's view that the United Mine Workers pension benefit was
in the nature of a gift, and remarked upon the worker's contractual right to
receive the benefit negotiated by the union with mine operators. See also
Bruch, 828 F.2d at 142 (quoting Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F. Supp 282, 286 (D.D.C.
1958)). The Court stated that:
In the first place, I do not agree that this Fund is a charitable trust,
involving mere gratuities, but am of the opinion that money paid from
[the plan] is in the nature of a fringe benefit, a term of recent origin, or
deferred, contingent compensation which the employees of signatories
may be entitled to receive in addition to their wages, and which was
procured for them by their bargaining agent, the United Mine Workers
of America .... An employee therefore has a contractual right to this

pension if and when he comes within the regulations prescribed by the
trustees.
Id. See also Ruth v. Lewis, 166 F. Supp. 346, 349 (D.D.C. 1958) (stating that
"[the] Court is of the opinion that despite the contractual provisions in the
trust instrument giving absolute discretion to determine eligibility to the fund,
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appeared to favor the application of contract law when he
expressly rejected the contention that employee benefits are
gratuities. Judge Holtzoff identified the union worker as a thirdparty beneficiary of the contract between the mine workers union
and the mine operators. 166 But despite some helpful language
indicating that de novo review applied, at least as to questions of
law, Judge Holtzoff finally sought to determine whether the
trustee's actions were arbitrary or capricious.167 Judge Holtzoff
remarked:
There is another approach to this problem. Contrary to the
argument of defendant's counsel, the payments made from the fund
are not gifts or gratuities. The employer, in making payments into
the fund, is not making a gift. This fund was established pursuant
to a contract between the union and the employers governing the
terms of employment. Payments into the fund are part of the
compensation received by the employee over and above his weekly

judicial review does lie where applicants can show a breach of fiduciary trust,
fraud, or arbitrary action.").
166. Kennet, 183 F. Supp. at 317-18. In ERISA non-union plans, the
contractual nature of a benefit claim is stronger than under the LMRA
because the employee's contractual relationship is directly with the
employer-there is no middle man union negotiating on behalf of the worker.
When an employer's promises under an ERISA plan are funded through a
trust, the trust serves as security to guarantee the employer's promises,
however, the benefit is identified by the employer's separate written promises.
When a plan is insured, the employer's promises are somewhat different than
the trust promises.
Arguably, the employer's promise is to purchase
insurance, not to pay benefits. See Korobkin, supra note 71. The employer
contracts with an insurance company to assume the risk of paying the benefit,
disability benefits, for example, or in traditional health insurance, the medical
provider fees. In the group insurance plan, the insurer typically provides a
certificate of insurance to each insured evidencing the contractual duties owed
to the insureds. Where the benefit is HMO coverage, the employer pays for
the workers membership in the HMO. The HMO contracts with the member
to either directly provide medical care, or it promises to pay for services of a
specified group of medical providers or services. In group insurance, the plan
often recites that the group policy is the plan, and each Summary Plan
Description distributed to each employee typically contains a certificate of
insurance confirming the direct contractual relationship between the insurer
and the insured.
167. In Firestone, the Supreme Court rejected the LMRA analogy as a model
to support the application of trust law in ERISA claims because the Court said
lower courts had applied the arbitrary and capricious standard of review in
implied LMRA § 302 structural defect claims as a way to assert federal court
jurisdiction. See infra notes 176-183 and accompanying text. Professor
Conison criticizes the structural defect analysis, remarking that the arbitrary
and capricious review standard had been applied to employee benefit claim
denials long before the structural defect cases appeared. Conison, supra note
4. The United Mine Worker series of cases support Professor Conison's view.
None of these early LMRA cases even mention the basis for federal court
jurisdiction, and the cases do not cite what section of the LMRA, for example
either § 301 or § 302, the plaintiffs relied upon to support their claims.
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wages. The services rendered by him are the consideration for both
his wages and his pension ....The employee may be regarded as a
third party beneficiary to a contract .... The court concludes,
therefore, that recourse to judicial action may be had to enforce
rights under the fund and in such an action the Court will review
the legal rights of the plaintiff and determine whether any
erroneous decision has been reached by the trustees on questions of
law. It will also review, to a limited extent, decisions of the trustees
on questions of fact; certainly whether there is any substantial
evidence sustaining the decision on questions of fact .... Finally,
and it is not denied that this may be done, the Court will review the
questions of whether the action of the trustees is in any way
168
arbitrary or capricious.
In Bruch, after quoting the LMRA United Mine Worker
district court cases to emphasize the debate concerning the
contractual nature of an employee's claim for benefits, 169 Judge
Becker inexplicably ignored the
case for contract
law
predominance in his own standard of review analysis. Judge
Becker just assumed trust law governed benefit claims arising
from all ERISA plans because the LMRA courts ultimately decided
upon trust law to govern claims arising from Taft-Hartley Act
trusts 170 and because ERISA allows employers to use the trust as a
168. Kennet, 183 F. Supp. at 317-18. Later in the Kennet opinion Judge
Holtzoff backtracked even further from his suggestion that contract law forms
the foundation of employee benefit plans. Judge Holtzoff noted that "it is not
for the Court to determine the matter de novo," and then he immediately
followed that statement with the suggestion that "[t]he final question to be
determined is whether the action of the trustees was arbitrary or capricious."
Id. at 318.
169. Bruch, 828 F.2d at 142-43.
170. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately relied
upon the developments in the United Mine Worker series of district court
cases to summarily conclude that, since benefits provided under the LMRA
were administered by trustees and paid out of a trust, the trust law standard
of review governed in LMRA benefit cases. Bruch, 828 F.2d at 143. Here
Judge Becker cites Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1962) and Kosty v.
Lewis, 319 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1963) to support his statement that, in reliance
on the United Mine Worker district court cases, the District of Columbia
Circuit "settled" on the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. However,
in Danti the D.C. Circuit Court expressly noted a conflict among the United
Mine Worker cases in the debate whether a worker's interest in his or her
pension benefits under a Taft-Hartley trust is contractual or equitable in
nature. Danti, 312 F.2d at 348. Because the Danti Court found the facts
egregious enough in that case to hold in the claimant's favor under any
standard of review, the Danti Court stated that it did not need to resolve the
standard of review issue intertwined in the question of whether the worker's
right to benefits derived from contract law or trust law. Id. Interestingly, it
was the Kosty Court that first misread the Danti opinion. In Kosty, the D.C.
Circuit Court applied an arbitrary and capricious standard of review to a
worker's claim for pension benefits from the United Mine Workers of
American Welfare and Retirement Fund. The Kosty Court stated that: "[t]his
conclusion is fully in accord with the definition of the scope of judicial review
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method to fund employee benefit plans. 17 ' Unfortunately, Judge
Becker overlooked the fact that, while ERISA allows the trust form
to be used to fund plans, unlike the LMRA, it does not require
employers to fund non-pension benefit plans through the
establishment of a trust.17 2 Judge Becker proceeded to blur the
foundational basis for the Bruch opinion by repeatedly referring to
the unfunded Firestone severance plan as a trust. 173 Judge Becker
created even further confusion when he found that trust law
provided the basis for de novo review, but then immediately
provided instructions for the district court to apply rules of
74
contract law construction on remand.
articulated by this Court in Danti v. Lewis." See Kosty, 319 F.2d at 747
(citation omitted).
171. See Bruch, 828 F.2d at 142-43 (noting that in reliance on the LMRA
cases, the D.C. Circuit adopted the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, and
that the Third Circuit followed suit in Gomez v. Lewis, 414 F.2d 1312 (3d Cir.
1969). Judge Becker discovered two themes in the early LMRA district court
decisions affecting the standard of review analysis. Remarking on those
themes, Judge Becker stated:
First, the courts discussed the
impartiality of the LMRA
decisionmakers, and they relied on that impartiality in settling on the
arbitrary and capricious standard. Second, the cases also attempted to
determine whether an employee's interest in his pension benefits was
contractual or equitable. If the former, these first courts believed, then
judicial review of an administrator's decision would be de novo, as would
a court's review of a standard breach of contract claim. If the interest
was equitable, however-as is a beneficiary's interest in his right to
receive benefits pursuant to a trust-then the court would be more
deferential.
Id. at 141.
172. See id. at 143 (holding that "[w]e believe, however, that in applying the
common law of trusts under ERISA courts must be cognizant of the features
that distinguish the ERISA arrangements from the paradigmatic common law
situation. Both ERISA and the LMRA permit the trust form to be used by
employers for the benefit of their employees even though ... there will
sometimes be conflicts of interest between those two groups. This difference
does not prevent the trust form from being used, but it does require that trust
principles not be applied mechanically in the new context.").
173. See id. at 145 (noting that "[t]he trust [sic] at issue here provides
severance benefits, which are a form of wages. The benefits were offered as an
inducement to the plaintiffs, to persuade them to work for Firestone.").
174. See id. at 147 ("Because the district court applied the wrong scope of
review, and because that (arbitrary and capricious) standard was outcome
determinative, we must reverse.., and remand for further' proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We suggest several principles of contractual
construction which we believe will be relevant in the proceedings to come. We
begin with several rules of interpretation which aid courts in identifying the
intention of parties to a contract."). See also id. at 145 ("In construing the
agreement which embodies this aspect of the parties bargain-the
Termination Pay Plan-we therefore think it best to take as our starting point
the principles governing construction of contracts between parties bargaining
at arm's length. These principles counsel a construction of the trust [sic]
document steering a middle course between the constructions of the document
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It appears that Judge Becker failed to adhere to a consistent
foundational basis for his Bruch opinion because it somehow never
registered that the unfunded character of the Firestone plan
meant no trust existed. In Bruch, despite heroic effort, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals missed an opportunity to clarify a
muddled area of the law. 175 When the Supreme Court got the case,
it tangled things even further.
C. The Supreme Court Applies Trust Law to
Evaluate Plan ParticipantClaims for Benefits
Due Arising from an Unfunded Plan
In the Supreme Court, Firestone urged the Court to apply a
trust law-based deferential standard of review in ERISA benefit
claim actions similar to the arbitrary and capricious standard
applied in the review of Taft-Hartley trustee denials of individual
worker benefit claims under LMRA § 302.176 The employer argued
that, in light of Congress's intent to incorporate much of LMRA
fiduciary law into ERISA, and because ERISA, like the LMRA,
177
imposes a duty of loyalty on fiduciaries and plan administrators,
now offered by the plaintiffs and defendants.").
175. In fairness to the Third Circuit, it does not appear that Judge Becker
and his colleagues had the benefit of hearing from the United States
Department of Labor. The Supreme Court does not have the same excuse. As
indicated below, the Solicitor General's amicus curiae brief filed in the
Supreme Court based its argument that contract law should govern the action
on the fact that Firestone did not fund its severance plan through the
establishment of a trust. See infra notes 194-207 and accompanying text.
176. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 150, at 8-9.
177. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1) (1959) (stating that
"[t]he trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely
in the interest of the beneficiary."). LMRA § 302 (c) mirrors Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 170, and directs that employer contributions into an
employee benefit plan must be placed in trust and, held "for the sole and
exclusive benefit of the employees ... and their families and dependants." 29
U.S.C. § 186(c) (2000). Similarly, ERISA expressly incorporates Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 170 into the statute's fiduciary responsibility provisions at
ERISA § 404 by requiring an ERISA plan fiduciary to "discharge his duties
with respect to a plan solely in the. interest of the participants and
beneficiaries." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000). Since ERISA codified the same
trust law standard that Congress codified in the LMRA, courts deciding early
ERISA cases looked to LMRA § 302 decisions for guidance, without carefully
analyzing Congress's different goals in enacting ERISA and the LMRA, and
without distinguishing between the implied "structural defect" trust claims
arising under LMRA § 302 and the express contract remedies available in both
LMRA § 301 and under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co.,
453 U.S. 322, 332 (1981) (discussing ERISA's codification of the strict fiduciary
standards that a Taft-Hartley trustee must meet). But see Struble v. N.J.
Brewery Employee's Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 333 (3d Cir. 1984)
(reviewing trustee decision to allocate surplus funds to non-beneficiary third
party under de novo standard, and reversing award of summary judgment to
plan trustees).
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the court should import the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review applicable in LMRA § 302 cases to ERISA.178, The Supreme
Court quickly rejected the LMRA analogy, but for a different
reason than enunciated by the Third Circuit. The Firestone Court
stated:
ERISA does not set out the appropriate standard of review for
actions under [§ 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.] § 1132(a)(1)(B) challenging
benefit eligibility determinations. To fill this gap, federal courts
have adopted the arbitrary and capricious standard developed under
61 Stat. 157, [LMRA § 302 (c),] 29 U.S.C. § 186(c), a provision of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 ....A comparison of the

LMRA and ERISA, however, shows that the wholesale importation
and capricious standard into ERISA is
of the arbitrary
1 79
unwarranted.
The Supreme Court explained that lower courts implied a
remedy under LMRA § 302, known as the "structural defect"
theory of liability, in order to fashion federal court jurisdiction for
individual union worker claims under the LMRA, which did not
provide an express remedy for individual workers to challenge the
denial of benefits by a Taft-Hartley trustee.1 80 In ERISA, however,
Congress expressly detailed federal court jurisdiction and there is
no need to infer a remedy for individual workers because the
statute expressly authorizes plan participants to sue to recover
benefits due under a plan. In Firestone,the Court found that:
[T]he raison d' etre for the LMRA arbitrary and capricious
standard-the need for a jurisdictional basis in suits against
trustees-is not present in ERISA. Without this jurisdictional
analogy, LMRA principles offer no support for the adoption of the
arbitrary and capricious standard insofar as [ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B),
1 81
29 U.S.C.] § 1132(a)(1)(B) is concerned.

After rejecting the Taft-Hartley Act trust law basis for
applying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review in ERISA
benefit denial cases, the Supreme Court nevertheless announced
that trust law governed benefit claims under ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B).1 s2 It is hard to understand why the Supreme Court,
178. Firestone,489 U.S. at 109.
179. Id.
180. Quoting Seventh Circuit Judge Posner, the Firestone Court, described
the structural defect theory as follows:
When a plan provision as interpreted had the effect of denying an
application for benefits unreasonably, or as it came to be said,
arbitrarily and capriciously, courts would hold that the plan as
"structured" was not for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees,
so that the denial of benefits violated [§ 186(c)].
Id. at 109-10 (quoting Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836
F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1987)).
181. Firestone,489 U.S. at 110.
182. Id. at 111.
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after carefully distinguishing the Taft-Hartley Act jurisdictional
circumstances from ERISA, did not make the further distinction
that the LMRA cases arose from plans funded through a trust,
while the ERISA plan in Firestone was unfunded. It is especially
confounding to contemplate why the Supreme Court ignored this
obvious paradigmatic distinction when the United States Solicitor
General focused its amicus curiae brief, filed in support of the
employees, on the fact that Firestone did not create a trust to fund
83
the severance plan.
IV. THE TRUST LAW DEFERENTIAL STANDARD OF
REVIEW IS INAPPLICABLE TO § 502(A)(1)(B) CLAIMS
FOR BENEFITS ARISING FROM ERISA PLANS WHICH
ARE NOT FUNDED THROUGH A TRUST
A. ERISA Regulates Pension Plans and Welfare PlansDifferently
It seems such an obvious truism that it need not be stated,
but remarkably, federal courts continue to overlook the
fundamental premise that unfunded and insured ERISA plans are
not trusts. 8 4 In order for a trust to exist, there must be a trust
183. United States Amicus Brief, supra note 140, at 4. The United States
argued that:
Where benefits are paid out of the employer's general assets, it is unfair
to employees to defer to the employer's interpretation of the terms of the
plan. Firestone, like the courts that have reviewed employer's decisions
under the arbitrary and capricious standard, nevertheless contends that
it is appropriate to borrow common law trust rules, as was done in cases
involving LMRA trusts, and defer to its interpretation even though it is
biased. Trust analogies are plainly inapposite here, however, since
Firestone established no separate body of trust assets to pay severance
benefits, and the common law of trusts does not support application of
the arbitrary and capricious standard to administrators' decisions in
that instance. ERISA's own reliance on trust principles is selective, and
in no way suggests that Congress intended that a highly deferential
standard be applied here. Cases arising under Section 302(c)(5) of the
LMRA are doubly inapposite, since, besides the presence of a trust in
those cases, the LMRA mandates impartial administrators.
Id.
184. But see Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1148 (4th Cir.
1985). The Court stated
[a]ppellants argue that the arbitrary and capricious standard should
apply only where a formal trust fund is involved. Though many cases
applying this standard to eligibility disputes do involve trusts, there is
no reason to apply a different standard here. Where claim eligibility is
involved, it is necessary to ensure that primary responsibility rests with
administrators "whose experience is daily and continual, not with judges
whose exposure is episodic and occasional,"...
Claim eligibility
disputes, absent a finding that they have been resolved in an arbitrary
and capricious manner, must remain with those who formulate and
administer company plans and policies, whether formally trustees or
not.
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res-some segregated trust asset over which a trustee has
ownership-to administer for the benefit of the settlor's designated
beneficiaries. In an unfunded plan, there is no segregated res to
be administered by a trustee, and therefore, no trust.
Congress regulated pension plans and welfare plans
differently in ERISA.185 Viewed separately and out of context with
the whole statute, ERISA § 403(a)18 6 suggests that employers must
fund both pension plans and welfare plans through the
establishment of a trust, unless a plan is insured. Section § 403(a)
instructs that "all assets of an employee benefit plan [including
both pension plans and welfare plans] shall be held in trust by one
or more trustees." 18 7
However, when ERISA's fiduciary
Id. (quoting Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006 (4th Cir. 1985)).
185. The reasons for the regulatory differences become clear when we
consider why Congress enacted ERISA. Congress passed ERISA to reform the
private pension industry. The majority of the statute's "comprehensive and
reticulated" provisions target the pension industry and do not apply to welfare
plans. See Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361
(1980) (referring to ERISA's regulation of pension plans). One of the most
significant problems which Congress designed ERISA to correct was the
unfunded or under-funded private pension plan. Prior to ERISA, no federal
regulation required employers to set aside funds in anticipation of the
employer's obligation to pay pension benefits in the future to non-union retired
workers. Consequently, many employers paid retirement benefits out of the
employer's general assets or operating capital. If the employer maintained
good financial health, presumably retired workers would continue to receive
benefits; however, when the employer struggled, retired workers often lost
their benefits. The lightning rod for pension reform in the 1960's and leading
up to ERISA's enactment was the tragic consequence of the Studebaker
manufacturing plant closing. See James A. Wooten, The Most Glorious Story
of the Failure in the Business: The Studebaker-Packard Corporationand the
Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683 (2001); Dana M. Muir, Plant Closings
and ERISA's Noninterference Provision, 36 B.C. L. REV. 201 (1995). S. REP.
No. 93-383, at 32 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4902. The
circumstances are now well known. Studebaker did not separately fund its
pension obligations; rather it paid retirement benefits out of its operating
capital. When the automobile maker closed its doors in 1963, over 4000
workers lost their vested retirement benefits because there was no money to
pay continuing obligations after the plant closed.
At least partly in response to the Studebaker debacle and other similar
stories of unfunded pension plans failure to meet obligations, Congress
enacted ERISA in 1974 to reform the private pension industry. ERISA's
legislative history establishes, however, that Congress was not focused on
reforming the non-pension employee benefits industry when it enacted ERISA.
See Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the
Supreme Court Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 951,
963-77 (2000).
186. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2000).
187. Id. Additionally, ERISA § 401(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000), says that
the fiduciary responsibility rules apply to all employee benefit plans. There is
an exception to the trust funding requirements for pension plans, however, for
"any assets of a plan which consist of insurance contracts or policies issued by
an insurance company qualified to do business in a State" [ERISA § 403(b)(1),
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responsibility provisions are read in conjunction with the statute's
funding section, it becomes clear that employers can elect not to
establish a trust to fund welfare plans.
ERISA's funding provisions, which require employers to set
aside assets to fund pension plans, 8 8 do not apply to welfare
plans. 189 Consequently, an employer must set aside assets to fund
a pension benefit plan, and under ERISA § 403,190 such assets
must be held in trust. However, since welfare benefit plans are
exempt from the funding rules, employers are not required to set
aside any assets to fund welfare plans; accordingly, if the employer
chooses not to set assets aside, there is nothing to hold in trust. So
long as the employer does not voluntarily elect to set aside assets
to fund a welfare plan, it does not come within the trust funding
requirements of ERISA § 403.191 The result of the rather opaque
interaction of these rules is that many welfare plans are unfunded
because ERISA says they can be unfunded, while pension plans
must set aside assets to secure payment of the promised benefits,
92
and those assets must be held in trust.
The problem with ERISA is not that Congress regulated
welfare and pension plans differently, however, it is that courts
have applied broad general principles, such as the application of
trust law, to welfare and pension plans alike without accounting
193
for the regulatory and operative differences of the various plans.
29 U.S.C. § 1103(b)(1)], and for "any assets of such an insurance company or
any assets of a plan which are held by such an insurance company." ERISA
§ 403(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(b)(2) (2000).
188. ERISA § 301-305, 29 U.S.C. § 1081-1085 (2000).
189. ERISA § 301(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(1).
190. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
191. See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R.
REP. No. 93-1280, at 299 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5038, 5080,
and in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 4566 (noting that "[a] trust
also is not to be required for a plan not subject to the participation, vesting
and funding provisions of title I..."); S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 30, reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4866, and in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1,
at 616.
Section 15(a) [Fiduciary Standards] when read in connection with the
definition of the term 'employee benefit fund' makes it clear that the
fiduciary provisions apply only to those funds which leave assets at risk.
While the Retirement Income Security for Employees Act has the effect
of requiring all retirement plans subject to that Act to be financed
through the medium of a segregated fund, there may be welfare funds
subject to the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act such as those
providing sickness and disability benefits, which may not be funded.
Thus, an unfunded plan in which the only assets from which benefits
are paid are the general assets of the employer is not covered.
Id.
192. See United States Amicus Brief, supra note 140, at 9 n.12. See, e.g.,
Firestone, 489 U.S. at 105 (unfunded severance pay plan); Mass. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 136 (1985) (unfunded disability benefits plan).
193. See Difelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 454-55 (3d Cir.
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B. The Solicitor General Made the Case for
the Application of Contract Law
In Firestone, the United States Solicitor General alerted the
Supreme Court to the significant incongruity and the inapt
historical precedent of applying a trust law deferential review
standard to plan participant claims arising from an unfunded
employee benefit plan. The Solicitor General made several wellconsidered points.
First, the suggestion that ERISA's legislative history
indicates some Congressional intent that courts apply a trust lawbased deferential standard when reviewing a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim
for benefits misinterprets that legislative history. Referring to
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) claims, the Conference Report explained that
"all such actions.. . are to be regarded as arising under the laws
of the United States in similar fashion to those brought under
194
Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947."'
The Solicitor General reminded the Court that, in reviewing that
same legislative history, the Court had previously found the
quoted legislative history to contain Congress's instruction that
courts develop a federal common law of ERISA benefit claims, the
301 as authority to
same way courts had construed LMRA §195
develop federal common law in LMRA cases.
ERISA does not contain any express instruction to courts
detailing what standard of review to utilize in ERISA benefit
claims. The Solicitor General argued that Congress directed
courts to develop standard of review rules under the common law
of ERISA. In developing that common law, the Solicitor General
suggested that courts should be guided by Congress's goal in
enacting ERISA to assure that "every employee who becomes
eligible for a benefit under an employee benefit plan 'actually
receive it."'196 To further that goal, the Solicitor General urged the
Supreme Court to apply a contact law-based de novo review
standard in claims arising from unfunded employee benefit

2003) (Becker, J., concurring) (noting that because welfare benefits plans
operate on "pay as you go" basis, they are far less regulated than pension
plans under ERISA). See generally Bogan, supra note 185 (arguing that the
difference between ERISA's regulation of welfare plans and pension plans
requires that courts interpret and apply ERISA's preemption language
differently due to Congress's intent to occupy the field of pension regulation,
but not welfare plan regulation).
194. H.R. CONF. REP. 93-1280, AT 327 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.A.A.N
5037, 5107, and in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 4594.
195. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
See also Mass. Mut., 473 U.S. at 156-57; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers
Vacation Trust, 46 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983).
196. United States Amicus Brief, supra note 140, at 5, (quoting Nachman v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 375 (1980)).
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plans. 197
The Solicitor General did not discuss the difference between
LMRA § 301 and LMRA § 302 claims in response to Firestone's
reliance on LMRA § 302 precedent in urging the Court to apply a
deferential standard of review in ERISA benefit cases.
The
difference in the character of claims grounded in those two
different provisions of the LMRA, however, bears on the
persuasiveness of applying the LMRA § 302 trust law-based
standard of review. As previously discussed, claims arising under
LMRA § 302 are implied causes of action, founded in trust law, to
provide jurisdiction and a private remedy for individual
workers. 198 In contrast, LMRA § 301 expressly provides for federal
court jurisdiction and expressly authorizes both unions and
employers to sue to enforce collectively bargained contracts. 199
While courts have applied a deferential standard of review to
structural defect claims filed under ERISA § 302 due to the trust
law foundation for that implied remedy, courts have always
reviewed LMRA § 301 claims de novo, applying contract law
200
principles.
If Congress intended courts considering ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)
claims for benefits to copy the procedures in use to decide claims
under the LMRA, LMRA § 301 cases offer more apposite precedent
than do LMRA § 302 cases. While LMRA § 301 does not provide
an express remedy for individual
workers like
ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B), it does provide an express breach of contract
remedy enforceable by the union or by the employer. Given that
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) similarly grants plan participants the
197. Id. at 8-12.
198. See supra notes 119-138 and accompanying text.
199. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000).
200. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S.
558 (1990).
Many Taft-Harley collective bargaining agreements contain
agreements to arbitrate disputes. Courts review challenges to arbitrator
decisions under a deferential standard. See Gulf States Tel. Co. v. Local 1692,
Int'l Brd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 416 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1969) (where
controversy involves review of arbitration decision, a court has narrowly
circumscribed function and may not re-determine the facts or reach a legal
conclusion on those facts as found by the consensually appointed arbitrator).
However, not all disputes under collective bargaining agreements fall within
the labor agreement's arbitration clause and not all collective bargaining
agreements contain agreements to arbitrate. Where labor and management
are not required to arbitrate a dispute arising from a Taft-Hartley agreement,
each party has the right under LMRA § 301 to seek to enforce the contract in
federal court. The rules of civil procedure and the rules of evidence apply to
such actions. The trial court reviews the matter de novo, the parties are
entitled to a jury trial, and the parties are entitled to call witnesses and
present evidence in support of their claims. See Blue Diamond Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers of America, 436 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1970) (upholding a
jury trial award in action under LMRA § 301 against union for violation of nostrike clause contained in collective bargaining agreement).
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express right to sue "for benefits due under [the] plan," plan
participant standing under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) equals the
standing employers and unions have under LMRA § 301.201
Further, a plan participant's express right to sue to recover
benefits due under the plan more closely parallels the express
LMRA § 301 breach of contract remedy available to unions and
employers than the implied trust law remedy presented in LMRA
20 2
§ 302 structural defect claims.
Turning to the obvious, but overlooked, incongruity of
applying trust law to govern claims which do not arise from a
trust, the Solicitor General presented the heart of his argument
clearly and simply. The Solicitor General remarked:
[Tirust analogies on which other courts and Firestone so heavily
rely are wholly in apt to an unfunded plan.... [Ilt is obviously not a
trust, since no source of benefit payments exists separately from the
employer's own operating funds. As a result, there is no identifiable
and segregated trust property and, perforce, no trustee with both
legal title and an equitable duty to deal with such property for the
benefit of others. Without these incidents, a trust relationship does
not exist. The unfunded plan sponsor has only a contractual
'20 3
obligation to pay benefits from any source.

The Solicitor General observed that the differences between
unfunded plans and trusts affect the foundational rationale for
deferring to a plan administrator's discretionary decisions in
ERISA.
The Solicitor General stated:
The loose standard of review is also inappropriate because the
absence of a separate, identified source of benefits fundamentally
alters the trustee's task under a funded plan of "provid[ing] benefits
to as many intended employees as is economically possible while
protecting the financial stability of the [plan]." Unlike a funded
plan's trustee, whose decision must "balance[] the interests of
present claimants against the interests of future claimants," the
administrator of an unfunded plan necessarily chooses between the
201. See Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Demisay, 508 U.S. 581,

589-92 (1993) (comparing claims under LMRA § 301 to claims asserted to arise
under LMRA § 302). See also Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1371 (9th Cir.

1976) (confusing claims filed under LMRA § 301 with those asserting
jurisdiction and liability under LMRA § 302).
202. See Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 436

F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1970) (jury trial award upheld in action under LMRA § 301
against union for violation of no-strike clause contained in collective
bargaining agreement). See also Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters Joint Council
No. 43, 431 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (granting jury trial in ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B) claim by analogy to claims under LMRA § 301 which allow jury
trials in action to enforce collective bargaining agreements).
203. United States Amicus Brief, supra note 140, at 8 (internal citations
omitted). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 2, 74, cmt. a (1959), and
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, supra note 59, §§ 1, 17, n.12, 111.
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interest of individual plan beneficiaries on the one hand and the
employer's desire to hold down business expenses on the other. This
latter choice has little in common with an unbiased trustee's making
of tradeoffs between various interests of different plan
beneficiaries.

20 4

The Supreme Court did not agree or disagree with the
Solicitor General in Firestone. Because the Court found an
alternative basis to hold that the requested de novo review
standard governed the former Firestone worker's claims, the Court
did not examine the Solicitor General's arguments. 20 5 While lower
courts have necessarily followed Firestone's instructions to apply
trust law in resolving standard of review questions, the recent
Supreme Court ruling in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co.
v. Knudson,20 6 casts doubt on the notion that trust law provides
the only paradigm to review all § 502 claims. Contrary to the trust
law-based foundational assumptions in Firestone, Great-West
suggests that ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) claims for benefits are based in
contract and seek legal relief. Great-West, therefore, re-vitalizes
the Solicitor General's arguments that contract law, not trust law,
standards govern plan participant benefit claims arising from
20 7
plans that are not funded through the establishment of a trust.
204. United States Amicus Brief, supranote 140, at 9.
205. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115. The Supreme Court apparently thought the
distinction between funded plans and unfunded plans, as suggested by the
Solicitor General, was rendered moot by the Court's holding that de novo
review applied, though under trust law, not contract law. The FirestoneCourt
stated:
Because we do not rest our decision on the concern for impartiality that
guided the Court of Appeals, we need not distinguish between types of
plans or focus on the motivations of plan administrators and fiduciaries.
Thus for purposes of actions under [ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.]
§ 1132(a)(1)(B), the de novo standard of review applies regardless of
whether the plan at issue is funded or unfunded and regardless of
whether the administrator or fiduciary is operating under a possible or
actual conflict of interest. Of course, if a benefit plan gives discretion to
an administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of
interest, that conflict must be weighed as a "facto[r] in determining
whether there is an abuse of discretion.
Id. The Firestone Court failed to comprehend that it mattered greatly whether
the de novo review standard it applied arose from contract law or trust law. If
contract law governed, on remand the plan participant would have been
entitled to a jury trial; if de novo review applied under trust law's equitable
nature, no right to a jury trial attached. See infra notes 247-286 and
accompanying text. Further, by directing employers how to obtain deferential
review under trust law, the Court set the stage for just the occurrence it
apparently wanted to avoid-that court interpretations would render plan
participants worse off under ERISA then they had been under pre-existing
state law governance. Firestone,489 U.S. at 115.
206. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
207. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 113-14 (noting that "[a]pplying Firestone's
reading of ERISA [calling for deferential review] would require us to impose a
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C. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson
Suggests that Plan ParticipantsClaims for Benefits
Under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) Seek Legal Relief
The Supreme Court has been engaged in an internal struggle
for a number of years trying to define what "equitable" remedies
are available under ERISA § 502,20 8 the statute's civil enforcement

standard of review that would afford less protections to employees and their
beneficiaries than they enjoyed before ERISA was enacted.").
208. ERISA's civil enforcement provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000) provides:
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action. A civil action may be
brought -

(1) by a participant or beneficiary (A) for the relief provided in subsection (c) of this section
[concerning requests to the administrator for information], or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for
appropriate relief under section 409 [§ 1109] [breach of fiduciary
duty];
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the
plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress
such violations or (ii) to enforce any provision of this title or the
terms of the plan;
(4) by the secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate
relief in the case of a violation of 105(c) [1025(c)] [information to be
furnished to participants];
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), by the Secretary
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this
title, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress
such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title;
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under paragraph (2),
(4), (5), or (6) of subsection (c) or under subsection (i) or (1);
(7) by a State to enforce compliance with a qualified medical child
support order (as defined in section 609(a)(2)(A)[ ];
(8) by the Secretary, or by an employer or other person referred to in
section 101(f)(1)[ ], to enjoin any act or practice which violates
subsection (f)
of section 101[ ],or (B) to obtain appropriate equitable
relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce such subsection; or
(9) in the event that the purchase of an insurance contract or
insurance annuity in connection with termination of an individual's
status as a participant covered under a pension plan with respect to
all or any portion of the participant's pension benefit under such plan
constitutes a violation of part 4 of this title [subtitle] or the terms of
the plan, by the Secretary, by any individual who was a participant
or beneficiary at the time of the alleged violation, or by a fiduciary, to
obtain appropriate relief, including the posting of security if
necessary, to assure receipt by the participant or beneficiary of the
amounts provided or to be provided by such insurance contract or
annuity, plus reasonable prejudgment interest on such amounts.
29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a). Paragraphs seven and eight were added to § 502 by
amendment in 1993, while paragraph nine was added the following year.
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scheme. 20 9 In the process, and primarily by way of comparison to
what "equitable relief' means, the Court has effectively
established that claims for benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)
seek legal relief. Close examination of the series of ERISA
remedies opinions issued by the Supreme Court since 1985, and
culminating most recently in Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.

Knudson,210 reveals that § 502(a)(1)(B) actions for benefits due
under a plan present claims for general money damages. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly described a claim for money
damages as the quintessential claim for legal relief. 211 Each of the
pertinent cases is discussed below.
1. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell

Under ERISA § 409(a), 212 an ERISA fiduciary can be held
personally liable for losses suffered by the plan and for "other
equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate"
resulting from the fiduciary's "breaches of any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries" by
ERISA.21 3 ERISA § 409 is expressly enforceable in an action
under § 502(a)(2) by the Secretary of Labor, or by a plan
214
participant or beneficiary, or by an ERISA fiduciary.
In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,215 a

plan participant sought to personally recover extra-contractual
compensatory and punitive damages under ERISA § 502(a)(2) for a
plan administrator's alleged bad faith delay in processing a
benefits claim, couched as a § 409 breach of fiduciary duty. A
majority of the Supreme Court held that in ERISA § 409 (a),
Congress did not provide, and did not intend the judiciary to infer,
a cause of action running to individual plan participants for extracontractual damages caused by improper or untimely processing of
a benefit claim. 216 Further, the Russell Court found that any
damages recoverable under ERISA § 409 (a), ran to the plan, not

209. See, e.g., Great-West, 534 U.S. 204; Varity Corp v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489
(1996); Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248 (1993); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
210. Great-West, 534 U.S. 204.
211. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974). See also Mertens,
508 U.S. at 255.
212. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000).
213. The Secretary of Labor, and plan participants or beneficiaries, and plan
fiduciaries are expressly authorized under ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(2) to seek "appropriate relief' arising from a fiduciaries violation of
ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
214. For the complete text of § 502 see supra note 208 and accompanying
text.
215. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
216. Id. at 148.
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217
to individual plan participants.
Because the plan participant in Russell ultimately did receive
her disability benefits, she did not bring a claim under ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B), and that part of ERISA's civil enforcement scheme
was not at issue in Russell. However, the Russell Court compared
a plan participant's various express remedies under § 502 and
observed that a plan participant can bring an action under ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B), to recover benefits due under the provisions of the
plan contract. 218 Further, the Court characterized the benefits due
under a plan as "contractually authorized benefits." 219 Russell
does not directly discuss whether benefits due under ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B) arise as a breach of contract claim or as a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty,220 but the opinion certainly recognized
the contractual foundation for a worker's right to recover
221
benefits.
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Russell speaks
directly to the application of ERISA's fiduciary's obligations in
processing benefit claims. Justice Brennan wrote separately to
emphasize that the majority opinion's focus on fiduciary
responsibilities owed to the plan should not be interpreted to mean
that plan fiduciaries owed no duties to plan participants and
beneficiaries. Justice Brennan suggested that plan participants
can obtain individual relief for an ERISA fiduciary's breach of
duty, though under the catchall language of ERISA § 502(a)(3),
rather than § 502(a)(2), as urged by the claimants in Russell.
While Justice Brennan stressed that plan administrators owe
fiduciary duties to process claims fairly, he clearly viewed the
remedy for breach of fiduciary duty as supplemental to a plan
participant's § 502(a)(1)(B) claim for benefits due under the
222
plan.

217. Id. at 141 (noting that "[a] fair contextual reading of the statute makes
it abundantly clear that its draftsmen were primarily concerned with the
possible misuse of plan assets, and with remedies that would protect the
entire plan, rather than the rights of an individual beneficiary."). The Court
specifically held open the question whether extra-contractual damages may be
available under ERISA § 502(a)(3), or any other provision of ERISA. Russell,
473 U.S. at 139 n.5.
218. Id at 147.
219. Id.
220. Justice Stevens found that Congress designed ERISA's fiduciary
responsibility provisions primarily to protect against mismanagement of plan
assets. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 140 n.8 (noting that "the floor debate also
reveals that the crucible of congressional concern was misuse and
mismanagement of plan assets by plan administrators and that ERISA was
designed to prevent these abuses in the future"). See also Muir, supra note 4.
221. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 148 (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 374-75 (1980) (remarking on Congress's repeatedly
emphasized purpose to protect contractually defined benefits)).
222. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 154 (Brennan, J. concurring) (noting that "an
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2. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates
In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,223 a group of plan
participants sued under ERISA § 502(a)(3), 224 to obtain
"appropriate equitable relief," including money damages, against
a
non-fiduciary actuarial firm, which allegedly worked in connection
with an ERISA fiduciary to cause the plan to be under-funded. As
a result of the under-funding, the plan participants received less
than their fully earned retirement benefits. The Court found that
"equitable" relief could, in theory, mean all relief available for
breach of trust in the common law courts of equity, which would
include the money damage claim presented by the plan
participants. 225 Since all relief available for breach of trust could
be obtained from an equity court, however, the Court found that
interpretation would render the modifier "equitable" superfluous,
and that it would also remove the distinction Congress drew
between "equitable relief' and "remedial" and "legal relief."226
Consequently, the Mertens Court held that "appropriate equitable
relief' as provided in ERISA § 502(a)(3), does not allow the award
of money damages, even though the Court acknowledged that
money damages were available in some circumstances under the
227
common law of trusts.
The Mertens Court did not examine claims under ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B), but the opinion supports the conclusion that claims
for benefits due seek legal relief. Specifically, the Court described
a claim for monetary damages as the "classic form of legal
228
relief."
3.

Varity Corp. v. Howe
In Varity Corp. v. Howe, 229 plan beneficiaries sued their
former employer, who was also the plan administrator, under
ERISA § 502(a)(3) for appropriate equitable relief arising from the
plan administrator's alleged breach of fiduciary duties, as outlined
in ERISA § 404 (a)(1). 2 30 The Court held that ERISA § 502(a)(3)
administrator's claim processing duties and a beneficiary's corresponding
remedies are not necessarily limited to the terms of §§ 502(a)(1)(B) and 503.");
120 CONG. REC. 29933, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at

91 (remarks of Sen. Williams) (noting that beneficiaries are entitled to recover
benefits "as well as to obtain redress of fiduciary violations.").
223. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
224. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000).
225. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256-57.
226. Id. at 257-58.
227. Id. at 256.
228. Id. at 255 (citing Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v.
Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570-571 (1990); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196
(1974)).
229. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
230. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000).
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provided a catch-all basis for plan participants to recover
individually for a fiduciary's breach of its duties as imposed under
ERISA. The Varity Court acknowledged that Congress invoked
the law of trusts to define the general scope of an ERISA
fiduciary's duties. However, the Court recognized that "trust law
does not tell the entire story ....

[since] ERISA's standards and

procedural
protections
partly
reflect
a
Congressional
determination that the common law of trusts did not offer
completely satisfactory protection."231 "Consequently," said the
Court, "we believe that the law of trusts often will inform, but will
not necessarily determine the outcome of, an effort to interpret
232
ERISA's fiduciary duties."

While explaining the extent of a fiduciary's duties under
ERISA, the Varity Court suggested that a denial of benefits can
amount to a breach of fiduciary duty. The context of the statement
is important. Varity Corporation allegedly defrauded its workers
by convincing workers to release the company from benefit
obligations in exchange for new employment and benefits in a
newly formed related company, which was insolvent the day it was
formed. 233 The former workers could not recover benefits due
under the new plan because the new plan was insolvent.
Consequently, the workers sought individual relief, in the form of
re-instatement to membership in the old Varity plan, as a result of
Varity's breach of fiduciary duty. The employer argued that,
similar to claims under ERISA § 502(a)(2) as determined in
Russell, the workers were not entitled to individual relief under
ERISA § 502(a)(3) because ERISA only authorized the plan as an
entity to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duties. The
Varity Court disagreed. Distinguishing Russell because it involved
a claim under § 502(a)(2) the Varity Court found that ERISA
§ 502(a)(3) is a "catchall" provision that authorizes appropriate
equitable relief running to individuals who suffer injuries caused
by fiduciary breaches that § 502 does not elsewhere adequately
remedy.234

231. Varity, 516 U.S. at 497.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 493-94.
234. Id. at 511-12. It was important to the Varity Court's conclusion that
ERISA § 502(a)(3) allows for individual relief, that the plaintiffs could not
pursue individual relief under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) because they were no
longer participants in the Varity plan. The plaintiffs resigned from Varity to
become employees of a new spin-off corporation and were enrolled in the new
benefit plan for that new spin-off corporation, which was insolvent the day it
was established. Lower courts since Varity are divided on the question of
whether a ERISA § 502(a)(3) claim must be dismissed where the plan
participant also seeks benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). See Tannenbaum
v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., No. 03-cv-1410, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5664 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 27, 2004) (citing cases).
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While the majority opinion clearly describes fair claims
processing as being among the fiduciary duties owed to plan
participants, and for which plan participant's could seek relief
under ERISA § 502(a)(3), the majority opinion also establishes
that the § 502(a)(3) remedy would be supplemental to the plan
participant's remedy to recover benefits due under the plan
pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). 235
Interestingly, Justice
Thomas, in his dissent, takes the majority to task for its
suggestion that a plan participant's challenge to a plan
administrator's claims processing activities involves an action for
breach of fiduciary duty. Justice Thomas' wrote:
The majority apparently believes that § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) "provides a remedy for breaches of fiduciary duty
with respect to the interpretation of plan documents and the
payment of claims." Ante at 512 (citing Russell, 473 U.S. at 144).
Since, in the majority's view, § 502(a)(1)(B) allows for individual
recovery for fiduciary breach outside the framework created by
§§ 409 and 502(a)(2), the majority wonders "why should we not
conclude that Congress provided yet other remedies for yet other
breaches of other sorts of fiduciary obligation in another, 'catchall'
remedial section?" Ante, 516 U.S. at 512.
The answer is simple. Contrary to the majority's understanding,
§ 502(a)(1)(B) does not create a cause of action for fiduciary breach,
and Russell expressly rejected the claim that it does. Thus, the
entire premise of the question is flawed. Section 502(a)(1)(B) deals
2 36
exclusively with contractual rights under the plan.
4.

Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson

Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,237 also
did not deal directly with a claim for benefits due under ERISA,
however, the Court similarly referred to that statutory provision to
contrast claims for equitable relief from claims seeking legal relief.
Great-West involved a claim by a plan insurer which had paid
medical bills for a plan participant. The plan contained express
language allowing the insurer to recoup its payments if the plan
participant obtained a tort recovery against the third party that
caused the injuries which resulted in the medical bills paid by the
insurer. Great-West sought to enforce the contract's recoupment
provisions, but was stymied by ERISA. The insurer's problem was
that ERISA's primary enforcement provision that allows for the
recovery of contract damages, § 502(a)(1)(B), does not contemplate

235. Id. at 512 (asking "[w]hy should we not conclude that Congress provided
yet other remedies for yet other breaches of other sorts of fiduciary obligation
in another, 'catchall' remedial section?").
236. Id. at 521 n.2. (Thomas, J. dissenting).
237. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
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breach of contract lawsuits by insurance companies against plan
participants. Great-West was not an entity that could sue for
contract damages under § 502(a)(1)(B) because that section only
allows for claims by a plan participant or beneficiary. 238 Further,
Great-West was not seeking benefits due under the plan.
Consequently, Great-West had to sue under a different section of
ERISA § 502, but nothing else seemed to fit. The insurer chose to
sue under § 502(a)(3) to recover equitable relief, but it clearly
strained to make its claim against the plan participant sound like
239
something other than a claim to recover money damages.
The Supreme Court held that, no matter that Great-West
couched its claim as one for "restitution" or for an injunction to
order the plan participant to pay money, what it was really
seeking was money damages, and a claim for money damages
presents the classic claim for legal relief. The Court stated: "Here,
to impose liability on [the plan
[Great-West] seek[s] ...
participant] for a contractual obligation to pay money-relief that
''240
was not typically available in equity.
Even more to the point, Justice Scalia in Great-West
questioned the equitable nature of the remedy the insurer was
seeking under ERISA § 502(a)(3) by remarking on the difference
between that section and section ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), which the
Court noted does not provide equitable relief. Justice Scalia
stated:
In the very same section of ERISA as § 502(a)(3), Congress
authorized a "participant or beneficiary" to bring a civil action "to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan," without reference to
whether the relief sought is legal or equitable. 29 U.S.C. § 1132
(a)(1)(B) (1994 ed.). But Congress did not extend the same
authorization to fiduciaries. Rather, § 502(a)(3), by its own terms,
241
only allows for equitable relief.
238. See supranote 208.
239. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210-12.
240. Id. at 210. The strength of that position is evident in the courts
citations. The Court quoted Judge Posner in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wells,
213 F.3d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 2000) stating that "a claim for money due and
owing under a contract is 'quintessentially an action at law."' The Court
further quoted Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 918-19 (1988) (Scalia,

J., dissenting) by noting that "[almost invariably.., suits seeking (whether by
judgment, injunction, or declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a sum of
money to the plaintiff are suits for 'money damages,' as that phrase has
traditionally been applied, since they seek no more than compensation for loss

resulting from the defendant's breach of legal duty." It also quoted Mertens,
508 U.S. at 255, stating that "[mioney damages are, of course, the classic form
of legal relief." See also Tannenbaum v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., No. 03-cv-1410,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5664, *17-20 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2004).
241. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 220-21. The inference that a claim "for benefits
due" under ERISA § 502 (a)(1)(B) presents a claim for legal relief is even
stronger than suggested in Great-West where Justice Scalia compared § 502
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Great-West does not hold that claims for benefits due under
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) are claims for legal relief-that was not the
issue in the case, consequently, the above quoted language from
Great-West is dicta. However, the logic of the argument that
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) provides a contract claim for legal relief is
overwhelming. Congress invoked the law of trusts selectively in
ERISA242, and aimed its fiduciary responsibility provisions at
trustees primarily in their role as asset managers. 243 Consistent
with that selective application and incorporation of trust law,
ERISA's remedies provision includes both equitable remedies
consistent with trust law, and a claim for legal relief to recover
benefits due under the plan, a claim that is consistent with
contract and insurance law. The fact that ERISA does not require
welfare benefit plans to be funded through a trust, as it does
pension plans (unless the pension plan is funded through
insurance), and the fact that ERISA exempts plans funded
through the purchase of insurance from its trust funding rules
suggests that Congress did not intend that courts look only to trust
244
law to resolve ERISA disputes.
Standard of review controversies involve remedies issues and
should hinge on the nature of relief a claimant requests, similar to
how the question of a claimant's right to a jury trial hinges most
importantly on the nature of the relief demanded. 245 Where an
ERISA plan participant seeks general monetary damages due
under a plan contract pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B),
particularly where the plan is not funded through a trust, the
claim seeks legal relief and the contract law de novo standard of
246
review should govern.
(a)(3) to a plan participant claim under § 502 (a)(1)(B) "to enforce his rights
under the terms of his plan." Id. at 221.
242. Variety, 516 U.S. at 497.
243. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 140-42 (stating "[t]he floor debate also reveals
that the crucible of congressional concern was misuse and mismanagement of
plan assets by plan administrators and that ERISA was designed to prevent
these abuses in the future"). See also Muir, supra note 4, at 412 n.146.
244. ERISA provides for both a contract law "legal" remedy and it provides
for trust law "equitable" remedies. See Tannenbaum, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5664 at *18-20. There is no reason to think that Congress intended ERISA to
differ from other areas of Anglo/American jurisprudence and suggest that one
set of facts might not give rise to several and varied claims for relief. Facts
that give rise to a breach of contract may also constitute a tort (bad faith
breach of contract). The same conduct that is a violation of the securities laws
can also amount to a common law fraud. Just because a plan administrator is
designated by ERISA as a fiduciary, it does not necessarily follow that a plan
administrator's refusal to approve and pay benefits due under a plan
(particularly when a plan is not funded through a trust) is not a breach of
contract. It is, and ERISA creates an express remedy for the breach in
§ 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
245. See infra notes 249-288 and accompanying text.
246. Some danger exists for plan participants if courts, in fact, apply
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V. PLAN PARTICIPANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A
JURY TRIAL IN CLAIMS SEEKING LEGAL
RELIEF UNDER ERISA § 502(A)(1)(B)
ERISA does not expressly address the question of whether a
claim presented under the statute's civil enforcement provision
triggers the right to a jury trial. 24 7 Absent a statutory directive,
contract law to govern employee benefit claims. If courts strictly construe plan
language (drafted by the employer or its agents without input from plan
participants) which grants the employer or plan administrator sole discretion
to determine clams, then un-empowered plan participants could again find
themselves unprotected from abusive claim practices in similar fashion to
pension claimants at the turn of the 20th Century. See, e.g., Adams v. LTV
Steel Mining Co., 936 F.2d 368, 370-71 (8th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 502 U.S.
1073 (1992) (stating that ERISA allows an employer's self-interested contract
provisions). In Bruch, 828 F.2d at 134, the Third Circuit suggested that plan
language giving employers unfettered discretion would violate public policy.
Id. at 139 (citing Teamsters Union Local No. 115 Pension Plan v. Yahn &
McDonnell, Inc., 787 F.2d 128, 142 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that statute
providing for presumption of correctness violates due process), affd without
opinion by equally divided Court, 481 U.S. 735 (1987); Graham v. Scissor-Tail,
Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 180 (Cal. 1981) (holding arbitration provision
unconscionable because it designated conflicted former union official as
arbitrator); In re Cross & Brown Co., 167 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575 (App. Div. 1957)
(holding arbitration provision unenforceable where it appoints conflicted
arbitrator, citing: "the well recognized principle of 'natural justice'... that a
man may not be a judge in his own cause.")). Additionally, in Firestone, the
Solicitor General noted that a provision giving the employer sole and exclusive
power to determine benefit eligibility would not be enforceable under ERISA.
See United States Amicus Brief, supra note 140, at 6, 9 n.11. The brief argued
that
[L]anguage in a plan document purporting to give biased administrators
unbounded discretion to decide what the terms of a plan mean ...would
not be enforceable under ERISA.
Exculpatory language in plan
documents 'purport[ing] to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or
liability' is expressly 'void as against public policy' ([ERISA § 410(a),] 29
U.S.C. § 1110 (a).").
The Solicitor General also stated that benefit denials based upon language
giving the administrator unbounded discretionary authority may be
unreasonable and in bad faith. See United States Amicus Brief, supra note
140, at 7 (citing Gitelson v. Du Pont, 215 N.E.2d 336, 338 (N.Y. 1966); Garner
v. Girard Trust Bank, 275 A.2d 359, 361 (Pa. 1971)). See also Herzberger v.
Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327, 330-31 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.); Northeast
Dep't. ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local Union No. 229
Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1985); Langbein, supra note 15, at 222,
226-28; Consion, supra note 4, at 33-34. But see Hamilton v. Air Jamaica,
Ltd., 945 F.2d 74, 78-79 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 938 (1992)
(noting that despite the court's misgivings, plan language which reserved the
right to alter plan and change payment practices without notice is enforceable,
even where it means that Air Jamaica promised nothing); Bruch, 828 F.2d at
145 (observing that employee benefit plans are contracts negotiated at arm's
length). See also Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Serv., Inc., 341
F.3d 987, 998 n.16 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting Firestone dicta that parties may be
able to contract for a narrow standard of review).
247. See generally Charles W. Wolfrom, The Constitutional History of the
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the question of a litigant's right to a jury trial rises or falls upon
the application of the Seventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 248 The Seventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that "in Suits at Common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved. '249 The phrase "Suits at common law"
describes claims in which legal rights and remedies, as opposed to
equitable rights and remedies, are to be ascertained. 250 Any
suggested curtailment of the right to a jury trial must be
"scrutinized with the utmost care" because a litigant's right to
have facts determined by a jury occupies a position of utmost
251
importance in our history and jurisprudence.
The Constitutional right to a jury trial extends beyond
common law suits and also pertains to claims expressly created by
Congress. 252 Where a statute, rather the common law, provides a
specific remedy, trial courts must examine both the nature of the
issues involved and the remedies requested in evaluating a
litigant's demand for a jury trial. 25 3 First, the trial court must
compare the statutory remedy to what would have been the
analogous common law remedy in 1791 to determine whether the
action would have been adjudicated in the English law courts, as
opposed to courts of equity or admiralty. 254 Second, the court
Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973); Edith Guild Henderson,
The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1966).
248. See Chauffeurs, 494 U.S. 558, 565 n.3 (1990) (citing Curtis v. Loether,
415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974)).
249. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. "[If the statute creates legal rights and
remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law"
the Seventh Amendment applies and requires a jury trial upon demand.
Brown v. Ret. Comm. of Briggs & Stratton Ret. Plan, 797 F.2d 521, 527 (7th
Cir. 1986) (citing Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194). See also Chauffeurs, 494 U.S. at
565 (stating that the right to a jury trial exists, and will be "carefully
preserved" where legal rights are at issue).
250. See Chauffeurs, 494 U.S. at 564 (citing Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433,
447 (1830)).
251. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959) (quoting
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)). See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195
(stating that "[when] Congress provides for enforcement of statutory rights in
an ordinary civil action in the district courts, where there is obviously no
functional justification for denying the jury trial right, a jury trial must be
available if the action involves rights and remedies of the sort typically
enforced in an action at law.").
252. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987) (noting that the
court must "determine whether a statutory action is more similar to cases that
were tried in courts of law than to suits tried in courts of equity or admiralty").
253. See Chauffeurs, 494 U.S. at 569 (observing that "the nature of the issue
to be tried rather than the character of the overall action," determines
whether a court must recognize a litigant's demand for a jury trial (quoting
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970))).
254. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41-42 (1989). See also
Brown, 797 F.2d at 527 (citing Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194 (noting that "[t]he
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examines the nature of the remedy requested to determine
whether the claim seeks legal or equitable relief. 255 The second
inquiry, involving the nature of the remedy as legal or equitable, is
256
most important.
In ERISA's early history, a number of courts acknowledged a
plan participant's right to a jury trial in claims to recover benefits
due under a plan.257 In the leading case allowing a jury trial,
Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters Joint Council No. 43,258 the trial
court applied the Supreme Court's Seventh Amendment analysis
and ordered a jury trial because the claim for benefits due under
§ 502(a)(1)(B) seeking money damages presented a claim for legal
259
relief.
ERISA's civil enforcement scheme provides a variety of
remedies, consequently, courts must distinguish between the
various remedies available in ERISA actions to determine the
specific issue to be tried in order to fairly evaluate whether a
litigant is entitled to a trial by jury in the ERISA action. In
Stamps, the court compared claims under ERISA § 502(a)(3) to
claims under § 502(a)(1)(B) to support its conclusion that
§ 502(a)(1)(B) claims seek legal relief. The court noted that
§ 502(a)(3) claims clearly provide for equitable relief. In order to
construe the civil enforcement scheme so as not to duplicate
remedies, the Stamps Court stated that Congress must have
Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory rights, and
requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and
remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of
law.")).
255. See Chauffeurs, 494 U.S. at 570-71 (stating that a claim for back pay is
essentially legal in nature).
256. Id. at 571.
257. See generally Annot., Plaintiffs Right to Jury Trial in Civil Actions
under § 502(a)(1)(B) of Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 56 A.L.R.
FED. 880 (Supp. 2001) (reviewing cases that have considered the right to a
jury trial in ERISA actions). See also George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Jury Trial
Mandated for Benefit Claims Actions, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 361 (1992); Ann
Bersi, Comment, The Road Less Traveled is the Better Way: New Routes to the
Right to Jury Trial in ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B) Actions, 27 CAL W. L. REV.
431 (1991); Michael McCabe, Jr., The Right To a Jury Trial in Benefit
Recovery Actions Brought under ERISA Section 502 (a)(1)(B), 20 U. BALT. L.
REV. 479 (1991); Note, The Right to Jury Trial in Enforcement Actions under
Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, 96 HARv. L. REV. 737 (1983).
258. 431 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
259. Id. at 747. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 370 (1974)
(stating that '"where an action is simply for the recovery ...of a money
judgment, the action is one at law."') (quoting Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S.
146, 151 (1891)); Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196 (noting that an action for money
damages was "the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law.");
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 476 (1962) ("Petitioner's
contention ... is that insofar as the complaint requests a money judgment it
presents a claim which is unquestionably legal. We agree with that
contention.").
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intended § 502(a)(1)(B) to provide a legal claim for relief260
The Stamps Court also supported its conclusion that the plan
participant was entitled to a jury trial by analogizing the claim for
benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) to claims under LMRA § 301.
The Stamps Court noted that ERISA's legislative history
instructed courts to look to the case law interpreting LMRA § 301
261
for guidance in considering claims under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).
Since LMRA § 301 claims were essentially contract claims for
monetary damages which allowed claimants the right to a jury
trial, the Stamps Court found support in the LMRA cases to grant
the plan participant seeking money damages under ERISA
262
§ 502(a)(1)(B) the right to a jury trial.
Following Stamps, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed the jury trial question in Wardle v. Central States,
Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund,263 and expressly
rejected the Stamps Court analysis. 264 In Wardle, the worker
sought pension benefits of $92,000 under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).
The primary issue for the court was whether the worker was an
employee under the terms of the Teamsters' pension plan for the
necessary twenty years of continuous service, or whether the
worker operated as an independent contractor for some period of
those twenty years. The Court started its analysis by concluding,
apparently with the worker's agreement, that it was to review the
plan administrator's interpretation of the plan language under an
arbitrary and capricious standard. 265 The plan recited that in the
determination of employee status, "the common law test, or the
applicable statutory definition of master-servant relationship,
shall control."266 The Court then found that under applicable
master-servant law, the specific question of the claimant's status
as either an employee or independent contractor turned on a
question of fact. 267 Since a fact question controlled, the Wardle
Court addressed the worker's demand for a jury trial.
The Wardle Court disagreed with the Stamps Court's analysis
that § 502(a)(1)(B) must present a claim for legal relief, because if
it were an equitable claim, it would duplicate the claim expressly

260. Id. at 747.

261. Id.
262. Id. See also Pollock v. Castrovinci, 476 F. Supp. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Burton v. Cent. States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, BNA Pens. Rep. No.
226, D-1 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); see also Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local
No. 391, 494 U.S. at 558 (discussing fair representation claim under LMRA
§ 301); Cox v. C. H. Masland & Sons, Inc., 607 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1979)
(reviewing a suit for breach of collectively bargained contract).
263. 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1980).
264. Id. at 829.
265. See id. at 823-24.
266. Id. at 822.
267. Id. at 828.
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granted in § 502(a)(3). The Wardle Court noted that Congress
expressly granted state courts concurrent jurisdiction only in
§ 502(a)(1)(B) claims and found that distinction enough to
overcome the Stamps Court's surplusage analysis. 268 The Wardle
Court then also dismissed the Stamps Court rationale founded in
the analogy to LMRA § 301 by noting that ERISA's legislative
history only said § 502(a)(1)(B) claims are to be regarded "in
similar fashion" to § 301 claims-Congress did not say the claims
269
are identical.
Wardle is a flawed opinion. The Supreme Court has often
declared that "[t]he Seventh Amendment question depends on the
nature of the issue to be tried rather than the character of the
overall action." 270 The Wardle Court disagreed with the Stamps
Court expressed rationale for holding that a claim for money
damages under ERISA 502(a)(1)(B) seeks legal relief, but the
Wardle Court never specifically examined the claim for benefits
due under § 502(a)(1)(B) to determine itself if the nature of that
remedy was legal or equitable-the Wardle Court did not consider
"the nature of issue to be tried," instead, the Wardle Court focused
on its perception that the overall character of ERISA is founded in
trust law. 271 The Wardle Court stated:
We conclude that Congress' silence on the jury right issue reflects an
intention that suits for pension benefits by disappointed applicants
are equitable. Such suits under the law of trusts have existed for
quite a while in state courts and have been entertained in federal
courts under their diversity jurisdiction. These suits have been
considered equitable in character. This conclusion has been based
primarily on the law of trusts, which provides a beneficiary with a
legal remedy only with respect to money the trustee is under a duty
to pay unconditionally and immediately to the beneficiary. Thus the
most reasonable interpretation is that Congress intended to provide
general federal jurisdiction over these equitable suits that had
272
traditionally been brought in state courts.

268. Id. at 828-29.
269. Id.
270. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391, 494 U.S. at 569
(quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970) (emphasis added by the

Court).

In Ross the Court found a right to a jury trial in a shareholder

derivative suit, typically an equitable action, because the issues to be tried
were breach of contract and negligence. Local No. 391, 494 U.S. at 569.
271. Wardle involved a collectively bargained pension plan presumably
funded through the establishment of a trust, as required by LMRA § 302, 29
U.S.C. § 186. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 823.
272. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829. The Wardle Court's suggestion that Congress'
failure to include any express directions regarding the right to a jury trial
should be considered as evidence that Congress intended no right to exist is
totally unsupported and is contrary to the Supreme Court's oft-repeated
instruction that "[m]aintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such
importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that
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The Wardle Court then revealed perhaps the real basis for its
opinion. The court went back its opening mantra that federal
district courts review ERISA claims under an arbitrary and
capricious standard of review. The Wardle Court found that "the
limited scope of review bespeaks a legislative scheme granting
initial discretionary decisionmaking to bodies other than the
federal courts, with which federal jury trials have proved
incompatible." 273 This statement suggests that the Wardle Court
was thinking about a wholly separate body of judicial deference
law, which allows Congress to delegate the resolution of a claim
asserting "public rights" to an administrative agency or a
specialized court of equity. 274 In ERISA claims, courts typically
275
recite that they defer to the discretionary decisions of trustees
but trust law judicial deference does not limit a trust beneficiary's
right to conduct discovery and present evidence at a bench trial, as
ERISA courts usually do.276 Here the Wardle Court seems to
suggest that an administrative law type of judicial deference
controls. Under administrative law judicial deference, a trial
judge sits more like an appellate court than a trial court in
reviewing the administrative record created at an administrative
trial before a neutral Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).277 For
example, in Social Security Administration disability benefits
claims, the claimant is afforded the right to a hearing where
witnesses are examined and cross-examined under oath before an
ALJ. Because the social security disability claimant was afforded
the opportunity to present evidence before a neutral judge at the
administrative trial, a federal district court reviews the Social
Security Administration disability claim appeal under a

any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with
the utmost care." Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391, 494 U.S. at
565 (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959))
(quoting Dimick V. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)).
273. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 830 (stating that "[t]his incompatibility is further
evidence of the unlikelihood of any implied congressional intent to grant a jury
right in these cases."). Id.; Granfinanciera,492 U.S. at 53. As discussed in
DeBofsky, supra note 14, ERISA does not delegate adjudicatory powers in
benefit claim disputes to the Department of Labor or to any other government
agency or specialized court of equity. See also Bogan, supranote 14.
274. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
275. See, e.g., Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. Compr. Disability Plan, 195 F.3d
975, 981-82 (7th Cir. 1999); Vega v. Nat'l Life Ins. Serv., Inc., 188 F.3d 287,
300 (5th Cir. 1999).
276. See generally BOGERT, supra note 59, § 870.
277. See Leahy v. Raytheon Co., 315 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2002) (applying
incorrectly administrative law type of deference to an ERISA claim). See
generally Consion, supra note 4, at 21-33 (criticizing ERISA trial courts' use of
what the author describes as appellate review procedures in ERISA benefit
claims).
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deferential standard.
In ERISA, while courts continue to refer to an "administrative
record," which is just the claims adjuster's file-no sworn
testimony subject to cross-examination is present-the fact
remains that Congress did not delegate adjudicatory authority to
the Department of Labor, or to any other governmental agency or
court, to hear and decide ERISA benefit claims.2 7 9 The Wardle
Court's reference to a legislatively created body of initial
decisionmakers in ERISA claims is just fiction. This confusion of
an ERISA plan's internal claims and appeals process with a real
administrative law apparatus permeates many ERISA decisions
and arguably presents the true reason that courts have gone so far
astray in denying ERISA plan participants a fair opportunity to
280
present their challenges to plan administrator claim denials.
Despite the Wardle opinion's weaknesses, the vast majority of
lower courts to address the jury trial question since Wardle have
generally failed to parse ERISA's various remedies or seriously
consider the right to a jury trial in plan participant claims brought

278. Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327, 332 (7th Cir. 2000).

279. ERISA's

Congress

considered

and

decided

against

delegating

adjudicatory authority to the Department of Labor, instead granting express
jurisdiction to both state and federal courts to hear § 502(a)(1)(B) claims for
benefits due under an ERISA plan. See supra note 208 and accompanying
text. The Senate Finance Committee recommended that administrative
adjudicatory authority be granted to the Department of Labor under ERISA.
See S. 1179, 93d Cong.at § 602 (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 780, 988-90; S. REP. No. 383, at 116-117 (1973), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4999-5000, and in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 1063, 1184-85. The delegation of adjudicatory powers provisions of
the Senate Finance bill did not appear in the final Senate bill submitted to
Conference. Congress also dismissed a proposal to require arbitration of plan
participant benefit claims. See H.R. 2, 93d Cong. 566-567 (1974), reprinted in
3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 3813-3814; 120 CONG. REC. 29,941
(1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 4769 (remarks of
Sen. Javits). An attempt to reinsert administrative adjudicatory authority
was also defeated. See 120 CONG. REC. 29,563 (1973) (proposing Amendment
No. 482 to S.4, 93d Cong. 1st Sess.) reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 1245; 119 CONG. REC. 30,401, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1838. See generally DeBofsky, supra note 14.
280. See Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327, 332 (7th Cir. 2000)

(Posner, J.). Judge Posner stated that:
What may have misled courts in some cases is the analogy between
judicial review of an ERISA plan administrator's decision to deny
disability benefits and judicial review of the denial of such benefits by
The Social Security
the Social Security Administration....
Administration is a public agency that denies benefits only after giving
the applicant an adjudicative hearing before a judicial officer, the
administrative law judge. The procedural safeguards thus accorded,
designed to assure a full and fair hearing, are missing from
determinations by plan administrators.
Id. See also Bogan, supra note 14.
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under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits due. Because
courts view the overall character of ERISA as being governed by
trust law principles 2sl or because courts view the right to a jury
trial as incompatible with an arbitrary and capricious standard of
review, 282 plan participants have suffered the denial of a basic and
fundamental constitutional right to have fact questions
determined by a jury of their peers in claims for money damages
28 3
under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).
281. See, e.g., Borst v. Chevron Corp., 36 F.3d 1308, 1323-24 (5th Cir. 1994)
(stating that ERISA law is analogous to the law of trusts); Blake v.
Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1525, 1526 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting
that courts generally follow the Wardle reasoning); Cox v. Keystone Carbon
Co., 894 F.2d 647, 649-50 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that under ERISA plaintiffs
are not entitled to a jury trial); Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 268 (6th
Cir. 1988) (concluding that the district court properly denied a jury trial);
Howard v. Parisian, Inc. 807 F.2d 1560, 1566-67 (11th Cir. 1987); Berry v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006-07 (4th Cir. 1985); Blau v. Del Monte
Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 319
(8th Cir. 1982); Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1980)
(holding that because ERISA claims are equity claims, there is no right to a
jury trial). See generally Flint, supra note 257, at 387-91.
282. See, e.g., Berry, 761 F.2d at 1006; Calamia,632 F.2d at 1237 (discussing
the question of jury trials under the common law of trusts). Additionally,
some courts have held more particularly, prior to Great-West, that claims for
benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B) are equitable in nature and therefore do not
trigger the right to a jury trial, even where de novo review applies under trust
law. See, e.g., DeFelice v. Am. Int'l Life Assurance Co., 112 F.3d 61, 64 n.2 (2d
Cir. 1997) (citing cases); Daniel, 839 F.2d at 268 ("Although there may be
actions under ERISA in which a jury trial is proper, in actions for recovery of
benefits under section 502, there is no right to a jury trial.") (internal
quotations and citations omitted). See generally Annot., Plaintiff's Right to
Jury Trial in Civil Actions under § 502(a)(1)(B) of Employee Retirement
Income Security Act, 56 A.L.R. FED. 880 (Supp. 2001).
283. But see Adams v. Cyprus Amax Mineral Co., 954 F. Supp. 1470, 1477
(D. Colo. 1997) (finding the action to be at law) overruled, 149 F.3d 1156 (10th
Cir. 1998); Hulcher v. United Behavioral Sys., 919 F. Supp. 879, 885 (E.D. Va.
1995) (finding the claim to be legal in nature); Vaughn v. Owen Steel Co., 871
F. Supp. 247, 248 (D.S.C. 1994) (ordering a jury trial); Steeples v. Time Ins.
Co., 139 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Okla. 1991) (finding the right to a jury trial);
Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Def. Co., 850 F. Supp. 202, 203 (W.D.N.Y. 1994);
Puz v. Bessemer Cement Co., 700 F. Supp. 267, 268 (W.D. Pa. 1988); Abbarno
v. Carborundum Co., 682 F. Supp 179, 181 (W.D.N.Y. 1988). See also Springer
v. Wal-Mart Assocs' Group Health Plan, 714 F. Supp. 1168, 1169 (N.D. Ala.
1989) (denying right to jury trial based upon controlling precedent, but
predicting Supreme Court will grant right to jury in ERISA benefit claims
when it reaches issue); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Lewis, 753 F. Supp.
345, 348 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (jury trial available for all claims under ERISA
§ 502(a)(1), not just benefits claims); McKinnon v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 691
F. Supp. 1314 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (denying a right to jury trial takes away right
plan participants had prior to ERISA, contrary to ERISA's purposes); Cedar
Rapids Pediatric Clinic Emp. Pension Plan & Trust v. Cont'l Assurance Co.,
No. 86 Civ. 5192, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17467, at *2-3 (W.D. Ark. July 25,
1988) (noting that claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA § 502(a)(2)
is different that breach of trust claim and entitles plan participant to right to
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The Supreme Court's instructions detailing the analysis lower
courts should follow in evaluating a party's request for a jury focus
most importantly on the nature of relief requested in a party's
pleadings. 2 4 Accordingly, the most crucial question courts must
answer in evaluating whether the right to a jury trial attaches in a
particular action is whether the claim seeks legal relief. Further,
the Supreme Court's continuing remedies discussion from Russell
to Mertens to Varity and finally to Great-West, exploring some of
the differences contained in the various subsections of ERISA
§ 502, requires that lower courts reconsider the question of a plan
participants right to a jury trial in claims to recover benefits due
under an ERISA plan.
Following the Great-West Court's
characterization of claims arising under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) as
seeking legal relief, it seems clear that plan participants who sue
to recover benefits due, particularly from an unfunded or insured
28 5
plan, are entitled to a jury trial upon demand.
Great-West teaches that ERISA's civil enforcement provisions
provide varying claims for relief, including both legal and
equitable claims, and that a one-size-fits-all approach to ERISA
jury trial issues fails to appreciate ERISA's flexibility. Given the
differences in how ERISA regulates pension plans and welfare
plans, and given the differences in how employers fund plans,
either through a trust, or through the purchase of insurance (or in
how they do not fund plans at all), and given the variety of
remedies afforded in ERISA § 502, courts must separately
examine each claim for relief in an ERISA action to determine
28 6
whether the court must preserve the right to a jury trial.
jury trial).
284. Granfinanciera,492 U.S. at 41.
285. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 211 (noting that "[a] claim for money due
and owing under a contract is 'quintessentially an action at law."') (quoting
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.));
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 918-19 (stating that "[s]uits seeking to compel the
defendant to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff are suits for 'money damages',
as that phrase has traditionally been applied, since they seek no more than
compensation for loss resulting from the defendant's breach of legal duty.").
286. In Bona v. Barasch, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4186 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 20,
2003), the District Court for the Southern District of New York applied GreatWest to reach the conclusion that a claim for monetary damages under ERISA
§ 502(a)(2) is a claim for legal relief which triggers a litigant's Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial. The plan participant in Bona brought both a
§ 502(a)(2) claim and a § 502(a)(3) claim alleging breach of fiduciary duty. Id.
at *24. In the claim under § 502(a)(2), the class plaintiffs sought money
damages on behalf of the plan. The first prong of the test to determine if the
right to a jury exists, comparing the statutory action to actions brought prior

to the merger of the courts of law and equity, weighed against the plaintiffs'
demand for a jury trial. However, the Great-West rationale resolved the
second and more important portion of the test, whether the remedy sought is
legal or equitable, in the plan participants' favor and required the Bona Court
to grant the plan participant a jury trial. Id. at *101-06.
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VI. CONCLUSION
ERISA regulates welfare plans and pension plans
differently-in particular, the statute exempts welfare plans from
the requirement that employers fund plans through the
establishment of a trust. In Firestone, the employer did not
establish a trust to fund its severance pay plan; instead the
employer paid severance benefits out of its operating capital.
Despite the fact that no trust existed to pay the benefits in
question in Firestone, the Supreme Court applied trust law to
determine the standard of review applicable to the employees'
claims for benefits. Firestone has created a legacy of nonsense,
where courts routinely apply a trust law-based deferential
standard of review to ERISA plan administrator claim denials
where no trust exists, and where the claimant seeks the legal
remedy of money damages. Because of the Firestone Court's
suggestion that trust law governs employee benefit claims, a
majority of lower courts have also denied ERISA plan participants
the right to a jury trial in their claims seeking money damages for
benefits due under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).
The Supreme Court's examination of ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions, culminating most recently in Great-West
Life & Annuity Life Insurance Co v. Knudson, requires a reevaluation of Firestone, the ERISA standard of review issue, and
the question of a plan participant's right to a jury trial in claims
for benefits due under an ERISA plan. In light of the Supreme
Court's strong suggestion that claims for benefits due under
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) seek legal relief, courts must grant plan
participants the right to a jury trial. Further, since trust law has
no application in claims for benefits due arising from unfunded or
insured ERISA plans-that is, plans not funded through the
establishment of a trust-courts should apply de novo review to
plan participant claims for benefit under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).

